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Can digital information and communication technology (ICT) foster mass political mobilization? We 
use a novel geo-referenced dataset for the entire African continent between 1998 and 2012 on the 
coverage of mobile phone signal together with geo-referenced data from multiple sources on the 
occurrence of protests and on individual participation in protests to bring this argument to empirical 
scrutiny. We find that mobile phones are instrumental to mass mobilization during economic downturns, 
when reasons for grievance emerge and the cost of participation falls. Estimated effects are if anything 
larger once we use an instrumental variable approach that relies on differential trends in coverage across 
areas with different incidence of lightning strikes. The results are in line with insights from a network 
model with imperfect information and strategic complementarities in protest provision. Mobile phones 
make individuals more responsive to both changes in economic conditions - a mechanism that we 
ascribe to enhanced information - and to their neighbors’ participation - a mechanism that we ascribe to 
enhanced coordination. Empirically both effects are at play, highlighting the channels through which 
digital ICT can alleviate the collective action problem. 
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1. Introduction
In this paper we use a variety of geo-referenced data for the whole of Africa over fifteen years
to investigate whether mobile phone technology has the potential to foster mass political mo-
bilization and we explore the underlying channels of impact.
The recent spread of digital information and communication technology has fed a wave of
optimism and a large amount of rhetoric about its use as a “liberation technology” capable of
helping the oppressed and disenfranchised worldwide. According to this argument, popularized
by political sociologists and media scholars (Castells 2011, Diamond 2010, Shirky 2011), mobile
phones and Internet, thanks to the opportunity they offer for two-way, multi-way and mass
communication, and their low cost, decentralized, open-access nature, have the potential to
foster citizens’ political activism and even lead to mass political mobilization, especially when
civic forms of political participation are de facto or lawfully prevented.1
This argument appears particularly appealing for Africa. Although a certain degree of
optimism surrounds Africa’s recent development path (Miguel & Easterly 2009), reasons for
grievance abound, with the continent, and in particular Sub-Saharan countries, performing at
the bottom of the world rankings in terms of most indicators of economic, social and demo-
cratic development (World Bank 2012). The continent has also experienced the fastest rise
in the spread of mobile phone technology worldwide: while in 1999 an estimated 80 million
African citizens had access to mobile phones, in 2008 this number was estimated on the order
of 477 million, around 60 percent of the entire continent population (Aker & Mbiti 2010). The
spread of mobile technology across the continent has taken place against the backdrop of a very
limited, and in some countries practically non-existent, fixed-telephone-line infrastructure and
because of this, it is claimed to have had unprecedented economic and social effects on the lives
of its citizens, in particular the poor and very poor. The ubiquitous use of mobile phones in the
continent has also led to the emergence of a number of creative applications and technological
developments, such as SMS-based election monitoring, health and disaster prevention SMS-
based information campaigns, disaster relief campaigns and mobile banking (Aker et al. 2015,
Jack et al. 2013, Jack & Suri 2014, Rheingold 2008). Due to the lack of a fixed phone line and
high-speed Internet cabling, mobile phones are also the most used way to access the Internet
and social media in the continent (Stork et al. 2013), greatly enhancing their information and
communication potential.
Consistent with the liberation technology hypothesis, over the last decade Africa has witnessed
some of the most spectacular episodes of mass mobilization. Food riots swept the continent
between 2007 and 2008 (Berazneva & Lee 2013), while mass civil unrest (the Arab Spring)
exploded in the northern countries between 2010 and 2012 (Campante & Chor 2012b).
1 Already in 2007 The Economist highlighted the role of mobile phone technology in fostering political activism
worldwide, launching the term “mobile activism” (The Economist 2007). Digital ICT and new media, includ-
ing blogging and Twitter, are also claimed to have been instrumental in what appears to be a recent surge of
protests worldwide (Ortiz et al. 2013), from the Occupy Wall Street movement in the U.S. and the indignados
in Spain to the “Arab Spring” in North Africa and the Middle-East (Howard et al. 2011).
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Simple economic reasoning - which we formalize below - suggests that increased information
and communication brought about by mobile phones have the potential to trigger collective
action. This technology in particular can help individuals acquire and spread infomation on
issues and reasons for grievance.2 Due to its open-source and open-content nature, and hence
by granting access to unadulterated information, digital ICT also has the potential to offset
government propaganda, which curbs discontent via misinformation and persuasion, especially
when traditional media are under the control of the government or in the hand of powerful
interest groups (DellaVigna & Gentzkow 2010).
These arguments focus on the role of information provision on citizens’ private incentives
to participate, via its effect on the perceived individual costs and returns. However, when
strategic complementarities in the provision of protests exist, i.e. when the returns to polit-
ical activism increase or the costs of participation decrease the larger the number of others
participating, mobile phone technology can also foster mass mobilization through its ability to
promote coordination. Knowledge, albeit imperfect, of others’ likelihood of participating can, in
particular, foster individuals’ willingness to participate, and lead to the emergence of protests
in equilibrium, an outcome that would not result in a world where individuals act atomistically.
Despite the popularity of the liberation technology argument, there is no lack of reasons for
skepticism and no lack of criticisms, even outside economics. First, governments can use this
technology as a control, surveillance or propaganda tool, hence making protests less rather than
more likely (Morozov 2012). This effect is enhanced by the nature of the technology, which
makes centralized control possible, an effect that is magnified by the circumstance that physical
infrastructures as well as market regulation of ICT is, for obvious reasons, often directly in the
hands of governments.
A second often-heard counter-argument against the liberation technology hypothesis is that
digital ICT can discourage social capital accumulation and the establishment of “strong ties”
(in favor of “weak ties”) that are thought to be instrumental to mass mobilization (Bond et al.
2012, Gladwell 2010), ultimately leading to political apathy rather than mobilization.
Perhaps a more subtle argument why digital ICT might not ultimately lead to the emergence
of mass mobilization is that this technology has the potential to increase government account-
ability via information spread and greater transparency or to directly improve living standards,
in turn detracting from the rationale for mass political mobilization, which is widespread dis-
content with the perceived state of the economy and politics.
In sum, and despite a great deal of enthusiasm and plenty of anecdotal evidence on the role
played by digital ICT - and in particular mobile phones - in fostering mass political mobilization,
there are good reasons to be skeptical about the role effectively played by this technology, and
the evidence remains admittedly scant. The mechanisms of impact are also poorly understood.
As far as we are aware there is no systematic study that establishes a convincing relationship
between digital ICT and political mobilization and explores the underlying behavioral channels
2 Mass SMS, political and information campaigns are indeed increasingly popular in Africa (Aker et al. 2015,
Rheingold 2008).
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of impact, and this paper aims precisely at investigating these questions.
We bring the liberation technology argument to empirical scrutiny using several novel and
by and large unexploited datasets for the whole of Africa, respectively on the spread of mobile
phone technology and on protest activity. What makes these different datasets particularly
appealing is their level of geographical detail, which allows us to examine the spread of protests
and mobile phone technology over time across small areas within countries.
Data on local mobile phone coverage come from the Global System for Mobile Communica-
tions Association (GSMA), which collects this information for the purpose of creating roaming
maps for use by customers and providers worldwide. These data provide information on the
availability of signal for the whole of Africa (with the only exception of Somalia) between 1998
and 2012 at a level of geographical precision of between 1 and approximately 20 km2 on the
ground, depending on the country. GSM technology accounts for around 80 percent of mobile
technology worldwide and almost 100 percent in Africa.
In order to measure the incidence of protests, we use two datasets on individual protest
events, both coming largely from a compilation of newswires. First, we use data from a very
large, open-source dataset, which relies on automated textual analysis of news sources, the
Global Database on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT, Leetaru & Schrodt 2013). As this
is a largely unutilized dataset and since we have no control on the algorithm used to collect
the data or the news sources effectively utilized, we complement this information with a widely
utilized, but much smaller, manually compiled dataset on unrest in Africa, the Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, Raleigh et al. 2010).
We combine these data with data from a variety of sources about, among other things, pop-
ulation, nature and use of land, infant mortality, natural resources, distance to cities, to the
border and to the coast, kilometers of road, average rain and temperature etc. for approxi-
mately 10,500 (55 x 55 km) cells that make up the continent, which are ultimately the units of
observation in the analysis.
This very detailed level of geographical disaggregation allows us to compare changes in the
incidence of protests in areas within the same country that experienced differential changes
in the coverage of mobile technology. By focusing on within, rather than between, countries’
variation in the incidence of protests and the spread of ICT, we hope to alleviate the obvious
concern - and the ensuing bias in the estimates of impact - that ICT adoption and the incidence
of protests are correlated due to country-specific trends or shocks in unobservable variables,
such as the state of the economic cycle.
A major challenge to our empirical exercise is that between 1998 and 2012, Africa experienced
unprecedented economic growth. An established body of evidence (which we confirm based on
our data) shows that the incidence of protests is negatively correlated with economic conditions,
as worse economic conditions are associated with lower private opportunity costs of participa-
tion and provide a rationale for widespread grievance (Campante & Chor 2012a,b, DiPasquale
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& Glaeser 1998, Ponticelli & Voth 2011).3 Related literature also emphasizes the role of protests
and revolution threats during bad economic times as triggers for political changes and democ-
ratization (Acemoglu & Robinson 2001, 2006, Aidt & Franck 2015, Brückner & Ciccone 2011).
This suggests that, even if mobile phones play a role in fostering protests provision, one will
expect this effect to emerge in particular during recessions, when an independent trigger for
protests exists. As Africa experienced sustained economic growth over this period, this could
potentially hamper our ability to identify the effect of mobile phones on protest participation
in our data. Notwithstanding, the richness of the data, that cover forty-eight countries over
fifteen years, several of which experienced outright recessions, offers the opportunity to identify
the effect of interest at different points of the income growth distribution, and in particular, at
the bottom tail with considerable degree of precision.
Indeed, when we turn to our main regression estimates, we find strong evidence that mobile
phones are instrumental to mass political mobilization, but this only happens during periods
of economic downturns. We find no effect of mobile phones on protest occurrence during good
economic times, when protests are rare. This lends support to a qualified version of the “lib-
eration technology” argument: mobile phones are instrumental to mass political mobilization
provided sufficient reasons for grievance exist.4
Our estimates based on GDELT suggest that a fall in GDP growth of 4 p.p. (approximately
1 s.d.) leads to a differential increase in protests per capita between an area with full mobile
phone coverage compared to an area with no coverage of around 10 percent. Results based on
ACLED are qualitatively very similar. In order to control for the possibility that local economic
shocks or other determinants of ICT adoption and protests might drive our results, we also show
that our estimates are robust to very flexible specifications that condition for differential linear
time trends across areas with the same large array of baseline characteristics.
Although, by including in the regressions interactions of a large array of cross-sectional cell
characteristics with linear time trends, we attempt to control for the joint determinants of
protests and mobile phone technology across areas, a concern remains that even conditional
on these variables, mobile technology adoption remains correlated with unobserved trends in
protests. To address this concern, we use an instrumental variable strategy that exploits the
slower adoption of mobile technology in areas subject to high incidence of lightning strikes.
Frequent electrostatic discharges during storms damage mobile phone infrastructures and nega-
tively affect connectivity, acting on both the demand (as the risk of intermittent communications
discourages adoption) and the supply (as power surge protection is costly and poor connectiv-
3 This parallels findings that worse economic conditions are typically associated with greater incidence or risk
of conflict and insurgency (see Blattman & Miguel 2010, Collier 2000, Harari & La Ferrara 2013, Miguel et al.
2004). There is however also an argument that economic growth can foster rather than discourage unrest
through a rapacity effect (Dube & Vargas 2013).
4 Effectively in the empirical analysis we focus specifically on the interaction between mobile phone availability
and the state of the economic cycle. Note that citizens’ responsiveness to economic conditions is a key
parameter in several models of political accountability that explicitly account for the role of media (see, e.g.,
Strömberg 2015). It is precisely the fact that the media enhance citizens’ responsiveness to economic outcomes
that creates incentives for politicians and drives political selection.
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ity makes the investment less profitable). Based on NASA (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration) satellite-generated data on the incidence of lightning for the entire Africa, we
show that areas with higher average incidence of lightning display slower adoption of mobile
phone technology. A 1 s.d. increase in flash intensity leads to a lower penetration rate of mobile
phone technology of approximately 0.43 p.p. per year.
The 2SLS estimates - although typically less significant than the OLS - confirm that mobile
phones, on average, do not have an effect on protests, although they appear to be instrumental to
mass mobilization during bad economic times, which act as a trigger for protests. In particular,
2SLS estimates show even larger effects of economic downturns on the incidence of protests in
high-coverage relative to low-coverage areas, with effects as large as three times the ones found
based on the OLS.
As robustness checks, we show that our results hold true if we restrict to the pre-Internet
period or if we exclude observations during the Arab Spring. In addition, we show that the
effects are particularly pronounced under authoritarian regimes or when traditional media are
captured by the state. Using data on night lights (Henderson et al. 2012), we also show that
the instrument does not directly affect local economic development, which might itself affect
the incidence of protests while being correlated with mobile phone penetration. This evidence
reinforces our claim that the instrument is exogenous to the dependent variable. Possibly more
importantly, we find no correlation between the instrument and the outcome variable in periods
when mobile phone technology was unavailable, which acts as a test for the validity of the
exclusion restriction.
A remaining empirical concern is that mobile phones also increase the probability that an
event is reported in the news, and hence observed in our data. In this case our estimates
would suffer from a margin of endogenous selection: at the extreme these might simply be
capturing increased reporting rather than increased mobilization. To address this issue we use
micro-data from the Afrobarometer (for twenty-seven countries out of the forty-eight countries
in the analysis) between 2005 and 2012 to show that self-reported individual participation in
protests (as opposed to news-reported measures of protest occurrence) follows a similar pattern,
with participation increasing more during periods of economic downturns in covered relative to
uncovered areas.
A major advantage of using micro-data on protest participation is that they also allow us
to identify the precise mechanisms through which mobile phones affect political mobilization.
In order to investigate these mechanisms we borrow from and extend Jackson & Yariv (2007)
network model with imperfect information. In its barest form, the model assumes that agents
maximize the payoff from taking a certain action (in the present case, protesting), which depends
positively on the number of connections taking that action through strategic complementari-
ties, and negatively on the cost of participation. The latter in turn depends positively on
economic conditions, as worse economic conditions reduce the opportunity cost of participating
in a protest or increase reasons for grievance. Individuals in society differ in their number of
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connections and in their cost of protesting. Although individuals do not know what actions
their connections will take, they can make educated guesses based on the distribution of con-
nectedness in the population, which is publicly known. This is key for the determination of the
(stable) equilibrium level of protests.
In equilibrium, the level of protests is higher the lower GDP growth. There are two mecha-
nisms at work. For one, since worse economic conditions reduce the individual cost of partic-
ipation then the provision of protests will mechanically increase. This is a first-round effect.
If strategic complementarities are at work, though, this mechanism is enhanced, as individu-
als iterate over their neighbors’ best responses knowing that, when the economy does poorly,
their neighbors will be more likely to participate, leading to a second-round increase in protest
provision in equilibrium.
These effects are true irrespective of the extent of connectedness in society. However, if indi-
viduals with more connections are more likely to participate when the economy deteriorates -
an effect that we ascribe to increased information - or if they are more responsive to changes in
their neighbors’ propensity to participate - an effect that we ascribe to enhanced coordination
- then worse economic conditions unambiguously lead to a greater increase in protest partici-
pation in areas with higher connectedness. This is true because the magnitude of either of the
mechanical first-round effect or of the second-round spillover effect - or of both - are enhanced.
The model is particularly appealing in our setting. Access to mobile phones can be thought
of as increasing connectedness. If mobile phones warrant access to unadulterated information,
meaning that those with mobile phones are better informed about the true state of the econ-
omy, and hence are more likely to respond to changes in economic conditions (something for
which we provide direct evidence below), or if mobile phones improve coordination through
greater communication - or both - then the protest differential between areas with high mobile
phone coverage relative to areas with low coverage is deemed to increase when the economy
deteriorates.
Regressions estimates based on aggregate data from GDELT and ACLED potentially subsume
both mechanisms: increased information as well as increased coordination. We show, however,
that one can use micro-data from the Afrobarometer to separately identify these two effects.
Importantly, we exploit the circumstance that the Afrobarometer also provides an individual
measure of mobile phone use. Intuitively, one can tell these two effects apart by examining the
differential response between individuals with and without mobile phones to changes in economic
conditions and in the fraction of others participating, effectively a spillover effect. Although the
fraction of others participating is clearly an endogenous variable, due to a classical reflexivity
problem (Manski 1993), one can identify the spillover effect through variations in the fraction
of others connected in society, i.e. mobile phone coverage. If conditional on one’s mobile phone
ownership and the state of the economy, an individual in an area with greater coverage is more
likely to respond to changes in economic conditions, then this effect must work through strategic
complementarities.
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Consistent with this model, we find that individuals are more likely to participate during
bad economic times. We also find that individuals are more likely to participate the higher
the fraction of others participating in society is, even in areas with no coverage. Our estimates
imply that a 10 percent increase in the fraction of fellow citizens participating increases each
individual’s probability of participation by around 8 percent. This is strong evidence of strategic
complementarities in the provision of protests. Taken together, these findings imply that worse
economic conditions lead to an increase in protest through both a direct compositional effect
and a spillover effect.
Mobile phones, though, enhance both these effects. Those with mobile phones are more
likely to respond to changes in both economic conditions and in the fraction of fellow citizens
participating. Empirically, both effects are at work, implying that the mechanism through
which mobile phones foster political mobilization during recessions is both through enhanced
information for citizens and enhanced coordination in protest participation.
Our paper borrows from and contributes to different strands of literature. An established body
of literature focuses on the role of both traditional and new media on political participation.
A number of studies for the U.S. show that broadcast media and newspapers foster political
participation, most likely through information provision (Gentzkow et al. 2011, Gerber et al.
2009). These studies focus on traditional media and on civic forms of participation in advanced
democracies and it is unclear whether these findings extend to ICT and to spontaneous, less
codified and perhaps less civic forms of political participation in low-income countries and in
less mature democracies or in autocracies. One notable exception is Enikolopov et al. (2015),
who study and find a positive effect of digital ICT penetration on protest participation in Russia
between 2011 and 2012. Differently from us, though, this paper focuses on the role of online
social media rather than mobile phones.5
Alongside this, a small but growing body of literature emphasizes the role of traditional
media on voters’ political alignment through propaganda and persuasion, especially when these
are in the hands of government or are politically aligned (DellaVigna & Kaplan 2007, Durante
et al. 2015, Yanagizawa-Drott 2014), although independent media can counteract these effects
(Enikolopov et al. 2011). Free media can also discipline politicians and increase accountability
(Besley & Burgess 2002, Reinikka & Svensson 2011, Snyder Jr. & Strömberg 2010, Strömberg
2004) and social media have the potential to reduce corruption and favoritism towards firms
connected to the political elite (Acemoglu et al. 2014).
A different stream of studies focuses on the role of strategic complementarities in affecting
collective action. Particularly relevant in our setting is Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), who studies
the role of government propaganda during the Rwandan genocide. Using a global games ap-
proach, the paper argues that greater local radio coverage fostered participation in mass killing
5 There is also evidence though that Internet and new media can lead to greater political disaffection (Falck
et al. 2014). These results echo findings for the U.S. on the negative effect of television on voter turnout
(Gentzkow 2006) and results for Indonesia that show that radio leads to reduced levels of trust and social
capital (Olken 2009).
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not only through the provision of direct information, that the government was unwilling to pun-
ish perpetrators, but also through the spread of common knowledge, i.e. the knowledge that
others also knew (and knew that others knew), in turn solving the coordination problem that
plagues collective action. In a somewhat similar vein, recent work by Madestam et al. (2013)
shows that participation in Tax Day rallies in the U.S. was lower in rainy locations. Probably,
this is not only because individuals have greater private costs of participating, but also because
rain knowingly makes others less likely to participate, hence reducing each individual’s private
incentive to participate. Consistent with this, DiPasquale & Glaeser (1998) show that riots
in the U.S. are more likely to occur in cities than in rural areas, an effect that they ascribe
precisely to enhanced coordination when communication costs are lower.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 presents
descriptive statistics. Section 4 builds on the theoretical model, which is discussed in detail in
Appendix B, to lay out the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section
6 finally concludes.
2. Data
In this section we present the main sources of data used in the rest of the analysis. We start by
focusing on geo-referenced data on mobile phone coverage and we then document the available
geo-referenced data on protests. Further details on the data are reported in Appendix A. Most
of our data cover the entire continent (with the exception of Somalia, for which we have no
information on mobile phone coverage) over fifteen years, from 1998 to 2012.6
2.1. PRIO-GRID cells
Our primary geographical units of observation in the analysis are cells of 0.5◦ x 0.5◦ degree
resolution, approximately corresponding to areas of 55 x 55 km at the equator, which are
constructed by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (Tollefsen et al. 2012). The advantage
of focusing on grid cells rather than, say, on administrative partitions within countries, is that for
these cells we have data on a large array of socio-economic and other characteristics, including
population. This allows us to examine the relationship between ICT adoption and the spread
of protests across relatively fine geographical areas, while controlling for a large array of local
characteristics. The data refer to 10,409 cells, an average of 217 cells per country. Since the
contours of cells do not typically correspond to a country’s political border, we assign cells
spanning over more than one country to the country which occupies the largest area in any
given cell. At a continent population of around 885 million, each cell accounts for around
84,000 individuals. This is shown in row 5 of Table 1. For comparison, these cells are similar
to U.S. counties both in terms of population and extension.
6 The data refer to forty-eight countries. In order to keep the dataset balanced we do not account for the
creation of South Sudan in 2011, treating Sudan as a single country throughout the entire sample period.
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2.2. Mobile phone coverage: GSMA data
Data on mobile phone coverage are collected by the GSMA, the association representing the
interests of the mobile phone industry worldwide, in partnership with Collins Bartholomew, a
digital mapping provider. The data come from submissions made directly from mobile operators.
The coverage refers to the GSM network, which is the dominant standard in Africa with
around 96 percent of the market share (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia 2011).7 The data that have
been licensed to us provide, for all years between 1998 and 2012, yearly geo-located information
on mobile phone coverage aggregated across all operators. This allows us to measure the
adoption of mobile phone technology at a very disaggregated geographical level. The data
we have access to collate submissions from all member operators. The extent of geographical
precision of the original data submissions ranges between 1 km2 on the ground (for high-quality
submissions based on GIS vector format) and 15-23 km2 (for submissions based on the location
of antennas and their corresponding radius of coverage) (GSMA 2012, Sauter 2006).8 Our data
improve considerably over similar data used in previous studies. Most cross-country studies
typically use measures of mobile subscription or penetration, which vary only at the country
level (Ahn & Lee 1999, Gruber & Verboven 2001). Studies at a greater level of geographical
detail, on the contrary, typically focus only on one country (Aker 2010, Jensen 2007, Shapiro
& Weidmann 2015). The only studies we are aware of that use detailed information on mobile
phone availability at a fine level of geographical detail for more than one country are Buys et al.
(2009) and Pierskalla & Hollenbach (2013), although these studies only cover a limited time
span (respectively 1999-2006 and 2007-2009).
2.3. Political mobilization: GDELT and ACLED
Our first source of data on political mobilization is GDELT (Leetaru & Schrodt 2013), an open-
access database that, through an automated coding of newswires, collects information on the
occurrence and location of political events, including protests, worldwide.9 The dataset contains
an average of 8.3 million fully geo-coded records of daily events per year for the entire world,
although the number of observations increases considerably over time. For each event the data
report the exact day of occurrence and precise location (latitude and longitude of the centroid)
at the level of city or landmark. Out of the 20 primary event categories in the data, we focus
on “Protests”, defined as “civilian demonstrations and other collective actions carried out as a
sign of protest against a target”.
Since GDELT is a largely unutilized dataset and in order to probe the robustness of our
analysis to the measures of protests used, we complement the analysis with a widely used,
7 Based on restricted-use data from Collins Bartholomew we estimate that the operators submitting their data
represent 86 percent of the total market share of African mobile operators.
8 Since data on coverage are not available for 2005 and 2010 we interpolate linearly across neighboring years to
derive an estimate of coverage in these two years.
9 Data are available at http://www.gdeltproject.org/.
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manually compiled dataset, the ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010).10 We restrict to events that are
classified as protests and riots in the data. As in GDELT, events are atomistic in that they are
coded by day, and the data report their precise location.
2.4. Political mobilization: Afrobarometer
Both GDELT and ACLED data are derived from news reports. A concern here is that the
likelihood of a protest being reported in the data is itself a function of the availability of mobile
phones. This could mechanically inflate our estimates of the effect of mobile phone coverage
on protests. A related issue is that we have no information on the characteristics of individuals
who engage in protest activity which can help us shed light on the mechanisms through which
mobile phone technology possibly affects political participation.
For these reasons, we finally complement our analysis with information from the Afrobarom-
eter, a public attitude survey on governance and economic conditions in Africa (Afrobarometer
2011). These data have been widely used for research in economics and political science (e.g.
Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2012, Nunn & Wantchekon 2011, Rohner et al. 2013). Impor-
tantly, in addition to a large array of socio-economic variables, rounds 3 to 5 of the Afro-
barometer provide information on self-reported participation in protests over the previous year
for twenty-seven African countries, as well as information on mobile phone use. The data are
available for the years 2005 to 2012.
The version of the Afrobarometer that has been made available to us also contains information
on individuals’ locality of residence. This also allows us - although with a certain degree of
approximation - to assign individuals in the Afrobarometer to PRIO-GRID cells. We discuss
this assignment procedure in Appendix A.
One caveat with the Afrobarometer compared to GDELT and ACLED is that, apart from
the data only covering twenty-seven out of the forty-eight countries in GSMA, their time span
is also more limited, and only a limited number of cells per country are covered. Information
on the available data and the number of individual and cell observations by country and round
is reported in Table A.2.11
3. Descriptive statistics
In this section we provide preliminary evidence on the spread of mobile technology and mass
political mobilization throughout Africa. We focus on the 15-year period between 1998 and
2012, for which we have data on both coverage and protests from both GDELT and ACLED.
Figure 1 shows a map of 2G mobile phone coverage over the entire continent at 5-year intervals.
While, as of 1998, only 3 percent of the African territory was covered by the mobile phone signal,
by 2012 this figure was 27 percent. Figure A.1 zooms onto Nigeria, superimposing the lattice
10 Data are available at http://www.acleddata.com/data/.
11 Observations span over 51 percent of the countries’ cells and account for 83 percent of the countries’ population,
meaning that more populated cells are more likely to appear in Afrobarometer.
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of 0.5◦ x 0.5◦ grid cells. One can appreciate the level of geographical detail allowed by our data
together with the very rapid expansion in mobile phone infrastructure over the period.
This figure clearly does not provide information on the fraction of population covered, as
coverage is higher in more populated areas. We use information on the share of each cell’s
area that is covered by mobile phone technology and we assume that population is uniformly
distributed within cells in order to compute the fraction of individuals reached by the mobile
phone signal in each cell/year. In the rest of the paper we use this measure as our primary
measure of mobile phone penetration. We aggregate across cells using population weights to
obtain country-level or continent-level measures of mobile phone penetration. Row 1 of Table 1
reports the average population-weighted 2G mobile phone coverage across the 1998-2012 period
throughout the entire continent.
Continent-wide coverage starts from a value of 9.2 percent in 1998, reaching 63 percent in
2012. This very fast continental growth masks large differences across countries. Figure 2 shows
that among early adopters, such as Morocco and South Africa, coverage was virtually ubiquitous
by the end of the period. This is in contrast with countries like Ethiopia and Mali where, as of
2012, still less than 10 percent of the population was covered.
Turning to the data on protests, Figure A.2 reports GDELT data for Cairo in 2011 and shows
the level of geographical detail allowed by our data. There are as many as seventy different
landmarks identified, with the size of the circles indicating the number of days of protest in
each precise location. Events in Tahrir Square and Cairo University are easily recognizable, but
other episodes and locations that are probably less familiar to readers, such as the recurrent
strikes in the industrial district of Helwan in the southern suburbs of the city, are also identified.
In order to combine information on protests with information on coverage of mobile phone
technology, we compute the total number of events falling within each cell in each year and
we standardize this number to each cell’s population (in 100,000). On average, over the entire
continent, GDELT records 1.24 yearly protests per 100,000 population.
Trends in protests across the continent can be appreciated in Figure 3, which reports the
evolution of protests per capita over the entire continent. One can see a pronounced positive
trend in the incidence of protests, with an overall increase of around 200 log points over the
period. One can also notice a temporary increase in 2008-09, when the food riots exploded,
and a very pronounced increase in 2010-12 when the Arab Spring swept through part of the
continent.12
Alongside trends in log protests per capita, Figure 3 reports average GDP growth (the dotted
line) across the continent over this period.13 A remarkable feature of the data is that protests are
12 Figure A.3 reports the evolution in log protests per capita (plus 1 to account for zeros) measured in GDELT
separately by country. As the range of variation of this variable is very different across countries, we stan-
dardize these series to their value in 1998. One can observe an increase in protests around 2008 in countries
like Mauritania, Madagascar and Guinea that experienced food riots. The variation in the data is - in all
cases - dwarfed by the very rapid surge in protests at the beginning of the current decade, with clear spikes
in countries like Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, where the Arab Spring took place.
13 This is a weighted average of countries’ GDP growth using cell population as weights. GDP growth is from
the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012). It represents the annual percentage growth rate of
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strongly counter-cyclical, consistent with the literature cited in the introduction that protests
are more likely to occur when reasons for grievance abound and when the opportunity cost of
participation falls, both of which are more likely to occur during recessions.14,15
Data from ACLED provide an estimate of the incidence of protests per 100,000 individuals on
the order of 0.08, i.e. around one fifteenth of what is found in GDELT (see rows 2 and 3 of Table
1). One possible reason why the number of protests in GDELT is much larger than in ACLED
is that GDELT data are less likely to suffer from type-1 error, whereby truly occurring protests
fail to be reported or are misclassified. In particular, small mobilization events might fail to
be recorded in ACLED.16 On the other hand, given the automated coding, it is possible that
GDELT suffers from a higher rate of type-2 error compared to ACLED, whereby events that
are not genuine protests are incorrectly classified as such. A related problem is that, although
in GDELT every attempt is made to collapse multiple reports of a unique event into a single
record, the algorithm might fail to do so if the variables that uniquely identify an event differ
across articles and newswires. We revert to this issue when we present our regression estimates.
We have investigated at length the correlation between GDELT and ACLED. Despite the
marked difference in the number of reported protests, we find evidence that the incidence of
protests across countries and over time, as well as within countries, is very highly correlated
across the two datasets. This is discussed in Appendix A.
Turning to the micro-data from Afrobarometer, on average 12 percent of individuals report
having participated in at least one protest during the past year (Table A.3). Reassuringly, we
find a positive and significant within-cell correlation between self-reported protest participation
in Afrobarometer and the incidence of protests in both GDELT and ACLED. This is also
discussed in Appendix A.
4. Econometric model
As discussed in the introduction and shown in Figure 3, protests respond to the state of the
economic cycle, increasing during recessions and falling during booms. Worsening economic
conditions can increase the incidence of protests because they provide reasons for grievance and
because they reduce the opportunity cost of participating in mass mobilization. In this section
we use regression analysis to investigate whether mobile phone diffusion has an effect on the
incidence of protests and whether this effect varies as a function of the economic cycle.
GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 US dollars.
14 The same correlation is found using ACLED data (results not reported but available upon request).
15 Figure A.4 reports the cross-sectional correlation between mobile phone coverage and protests per capita in
GDELT (again expressed in logs of protests per capita plus 1) across all countries. Data are averages across
the period for each country weighted by population weights. The data illustrate a clear positive correlation
between these two series, with countries with full coverage, such as South Africa, showing rates of protests
per capita around 50 log points higher than countries with virtually no coverage, such as Ethiopia. Results,
not reported, are similar when using ACLED.
16 Indeed, compared to manually complied datasets, machine coded datasets have typically low rates of false
negatives (Schrodt 2012) and an independent appraisal of GDELT suggests that this performs particularly
well in this respect even compared to other automated coded datasets (Ward et al. 2013).
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In the rest, we start by modelling how overall protest occurrence in cells varies as a function
of local coverage and its interaction with the state of the economy. Information on coverage and
protest activity by cell is available consistently for the entire continent for fifteen years (based
on data from GSMA and GDELT or ACLED respectively).
In section 4.3 we turn to the micro-founded model that underlies this aggregate model. We
show how one can use data on protest participation and mobile phone use at the individual level,
which are both available from the Afrobarometer - although for a limited number of cells/years
- not only to validate results based on aggregate data but also to disentangle and quantify the
different mechanisms of impact.
4.1. Aggregate outcomes: OLS
In this section we start by modeling the occurrence of protests in a cell as a function of mobile
phone availability. We also allow for the effect of mobile phone coverage to vary as a function
of changes in economic conditions. With this latter term we intend to capture the potential
complementarity between economic downturns and mobile phones in protest provision. While
it seems unlikely that mobile phones will affect mass mobilization during good economic times,
it seems plausible that their effect will manifest when reasons for grievance emerge.
If we denote a generic cell by j, with j ∈ c, where c denotes a country and t denotes a generic
year, and ignoring other controls, our regression model is:
y¯jct = β0 + β1 Covjct + β2 ∆GDP ct Covjct + fjc + fct + ujct (4.1)
where y¯jct denotes the incidence of protests (or the fraction of individuals protesting, depending
on the data used) in a cell in a given year, Covjct is a measure of local mobile phone coverage
while ∆GDP ct is a measure of the country’s economic growth. fjc and fct are respectively cell
fixed effects and country X year effects, while ujct denotes the error term. The coefficient β1
in (4.1) captures the effect of mobile phone coverage on protests at zero GDP growth, while β2
measures how country-level economic booms and downturns translate into differential protest
activity in areas with different mobile phone coverage. This coefficient is negative if mobile
phones magnify the effect of economic downturns on protests. Below we also experiment with
more saturated specifications that include a large array of time-varying cell controls. We also
present more restrictive specifications where we constrain the coefficient β2 to 0, implying that
the effect of mobile phones on protests is the same at any level of economic growth.17
Ignoring other covariates, identification of model (4.1) is based on a differences-in-differences
strategy that compares changes in the incidence of protests across cells within the same country
experiencing differential trends in the adoption of mobile phone technology. Consistency of
17 Clearly, by including country X year effects, we are unable to identify the effect of GDP growth per se on
protests. We have also experimented with regressions that include additive country and year effects in addition
to the countries’ GDP growth. Estimates of β1 and β2 remain effectively unchanged, while we consistently
find a negative effect of GDP growth on protests at average coverage.
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the estimates relies on the assumption that, other than for differential trends in mobile phone
coverage, trends in protests per capita would be similar across cells within the same country.
In equation (4.1) we have constrained the effect of coverage to vary with GDP growth in a
linear fashion. One obvious concern is that our results may be driven by this functional form
assumption. For this reason, in section 5 we also experiment with more flexible specifications,
where we allow the coefficient on coverage to vary in an unrestricted fashion at different levels
of economic growth.
One additional issue worth discussing is the measure of economic growth used. A potentially
better-specified model than model (4.1) would include among the regressors the cell’s rather than
the county’s GDP growth, as protests are likely to respond to local rather than to aggregate
economic shocks. The reason why we focus on aggregate economic shocks is that measures
of GDP growth at the level of the cell are not available and the measures of local economic
conditions we have (that we discuss below) are likely to be affected by considerable measurement
error. Inclusion of these error-ridden variables will affect the consistency of the estimates of
equation (4.1).
Obviously, though, local economic conditions might themselves affect mobile phone penetra-
tion, which would require controlling for measures of local economic conditions in the regressions.
This is a classical omitted-variable problem, which leads to the second major issue underlying
the identification of model (4.1), namely the potential non-random allocation of mobile phone
coverage across cells. We start to deal with this issue by introducing in the model a very high
number of cell-level time-varying controls. The OLS estimates of the parameter of interest
will be consistent if these covariates control adequately for differential trends in local economic
growth and other local determinants of protests that happen to be correlated with mobile phone
coverage. As conditioning on observables does not necessarily adequately control for all sources
of potential correlation between coverage and the error term, in the next section we propose an
alternative strategy that relies on an instrumental variable approach.18
4.2. Aggregate outcomes: 2SLS
As a way to address the potential endogeneity of mobile phone coverage with respect to protest
activity, we exploit the differential adoption of mobile technology in areas subject to different
incidence of lightning strikes.
Frequent electrostatic discharges during storms are known to damage mobile phone infras-
tructures and in particular antennas on the ground that transmit the signal in their vicinity
and negatively affect connectivity, hence reducing both the supply of (as power surge protec-
18 An additional source of correlation between coverage and the error term is given by the gradual spread of the
Internet. This might be correlated with the availability of mobile phones and also affect protests directly. We
try to deal with this below by showing that the estimates remain effectively unchanged when we restrict to
a period prior to the spread of the Internet. Additional sources of bias might result from measurement error
in the coverage variable and, although probably less serious of an issue, by reverse causality, whereby local
protests might affect economic growth. Both these sources of bias should be addressed by the instrumental
variable approach discussed below.
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tion is costly and poor connectivity makes the investment in technology less profitable) and the
demand for (as the risk of intermittent communications discourages adoption) mobile phone
services (Andersen et al. 2011, ITU 2003). Hence, one will expect to see a slower adoption
of mobile phone technology in areas subject to higher lightning incidence. As we show below,
there is substantial variation in lightning intensity across areas, suggesting that this instrument
has the potential to generate useful variation in the rate of mobile phone adoption across cells.
In practice, we use as an instrument for mobile phone coverage the interaction between the
average number of flashes in a cell over the period 1995-2010, denoted by Flashjc and a linear
time (year) trend t that captures the generalized increase in mobile phone adoption across the
continent. In formulas, our first-stage equation is:
Covjct = δ0 + δ1 Zjct + fjc + fct + ηjct (4.2)
where Zjct = Flashjc X t. One can use predicted Cov from this model interacted with ∆GDP
as an instrument for ∆GDP Cov in equation (4.1).19
Our identification ultimately relies on the assumption that - conditional on the included
controls - protest activity does not vary differentially over time across cells depending on average
flash intensity, other than because of differences in mobile phone coverage.
This assumption might fail to hold unconditionally, as flashes might be correlated with geo-
graphical variables (i.e. distance to the coast or longitude and latitude) or climatic variables
(e.g. rain and temperature) or with the availability of other infrastructures or services (i.e.
electricity) that are known to matter for economic development and that might have an inde-
pendent effect on protests. As said, we temper these concerns by including a large number of
cell-level controls (e.g. rain and temperature, electricity grid, distance to the coast, latitude
and longitude, etc.). More importantly, later on in the paper we bring direct evidence in favor
of our identification assumption using data on protests for a period previous to the availability
of mobile phone technology. If lightning strikes and their interaction with GDP growth affect
protests only through their effect on mobile phone coverage, then one will expect no correlation
between the outcome variable and these variables in periods in which mobile phone technology
was not available. We use data from the early 1990s to test this hypothesis.
As an additional check, we also present regressions of measures of local economic develop-
ment on the instrument. For the exclusion restriction to hold, one will expect local economic
conditions to be unaffected by the instrument and its interaction with GDP growth.
19 Since we have two endogenous variables and two instruments, an alternative, more efficient approach, which
we end up using in the empirical section, consists in instrumenting both endogenous variables with both
instruments (Wooldridge 2010). In formulas our first-stage equations are: Cov = δ0 + δ1 Z+ δ2 ∆GDP Z+η
and ∆GDP Cov = θ0 + θ1 Z + θ2 ∆GDP Z + µ.
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4.3. A micro-founded model: mechanisms of impact
In this section we introduce a micro-founded model of protest participation that is consistent
with the aggregate model in section 4.1. Compared to the aggregate model, the advantage
of this model is that it allows us to specify and empirically identify the behavioral channels
through which mobile phones affect protest participation.
The theoretical model is described in detail in Appendix B. In the model, the private cost
of participation in a protest falls when the economy deteriorates, and the individual utility
from participation increases with the fraction of connected individuals participating. Individ-
uals make educated guesses about the probability of participation of their connections given
the degree of connectedness in society, which is publicly known. The best-guess estimate of
the probability of participation of each individual’s connections is the same for all individu-
als, irrespective of their degree of connectedness, and this also turns out to be the fraction
of individuals participating in equilibrium. Worse economic conditions increase participation
through two channels. First, they increase everybody’s willingness to participate, a mechanical
or purely compositional effect that we attribute to individuals’ information about the state
of the economy; second, via a spillover effect that results from strategic complementarities in
protest provision, an effect that we attribute to coordination among individuals.
We argue that mobile phones have the potential to affect both margins of response, namely
to make individuals more responsive to variations in economic conditions - an effect that we
label enhanced information - and to changes in others’ willingness to participate - an effect that
we label enhanced coordination.
The micro-founded empirical model of behavior that underlies model (4.1) postulates in par-
ticular that individual i’s protest participation yijct will depend on the state of the economy
∆GDPct and on the average protest participation in the economy y¯jct. Mobile phone use (de-
noted by di) can potentially affect both the intercept and the slope coefficients. In formulas:
yijct = γ0 + γ1 di + γ2 ∆GDPct di + γ3 y¯jct + γ4 y¯jct di + fjc + fct + ijct (4.3)
The parameter γ1 provides an indication of the differential protest activity between those with
and without mobile phones, irrespective of GDP growth and others’ propensity to participate.
γ2 provides a measure of the differential response to changes in economic conditions among
those with mobile phones relative to those with no mobile phones. γ3 provides a measure of the
spillover effect, while γ4 measures the differential response to changes in participation among
those connected.
Note that aggregating across individuals by cell, and assuming for simplicity that the fraction
of people with mobile phones in a cell (d¯jct) equals the fraction of people covered by the signal
(Covjct), this gives equation (4.1), where β2 ≈ γ2(1−γ3−γ4 d¯) and d¯ is the fraction of individuals
using a mobile phone in the economy. For the equilibrium to be stable we expect (γ3 +γ4 d¯) < 1.
If mobile phones make individuals either more responsive to the state of the economic cycle
16
(γ2 < 0) or to their fellow citizens’ propensity to participate (γ4 > 0), or both, then greater
mobile phone coverage has the potential to magnify the effect of recessions on protests (i.e.
imply that β2 < 0 in equation 4.1).
If one is able to identify the parameters in equation (4.3), then one will be able to separately
estimate what effect mobile phone coverage has on protest activity in response to changes in
economic conditions due to the mechanical effect and to the spillover effect.
Identification of model (4.3) involves some challenges though. Even ignoring the possibility
of non-random allocation of mobile phones across areas and individuals, estimates of model
(4.3) will still be potentially plagued by a classical reflexivity problem (Manski 1993). However,
equation (4.1) suggests that one can obtain consistent estimates of the parameters in (4.3) by
instrumenting average participation in the economy y¯jct (and its interaction with mobile phone
use di) with mobile phone coverage Covjct and its interaction with GDP growth. Effectively,
one can use the aggregate equation (4.1) as a first-stage equation for the 2SLS individual-level
equation (4.3). Intuitively, conditional on di, the fraction of those covered in society will only
matter for individual participation through a spillover effect.20
5. Empirical results
In this section we turn to the empirical analysis. We start by presenting OLS and 2SLS estimates
of equation (4.1), which analyze the effect of mobile phone coverage and its interaction with
GDP growth on the incidence of protests by cell and area. Later on in the analysis we turn to
the micro-data from the Afrobarometer and present estimates of equation (4.3).
5.1. Aggregate outcomes: OLS
Table 2 presents estimates of equation (4.1), where the dependent variable is the number of
protests per capita in each cell/year as measured in GDELT (columns 1 to 4) and ACLED
(columns 5 to 8). All specifications include cell fixed effects plus country X year effects and in
even-numbered columns we include additionally a very large number of cell-level characteris-
tics. These include the few available time-varying cell characteristics (log local population and
a dummy for civil conflict), as well as a large number of cross-sectional cell characteristics inter-
acted with a linear time trend.21 All regressions are weighted by population size and standard
20 Similarly to section 4.2, in practice we have two endogenous variables and four instruments. We follow the
approach outlined in footnote 19 to increase efficiency of the first-stage estimates.
21 Cell characteristics include: fraction of the cell’s area covered by mountains, forests, oilfields and irrigated
land; dummies for the presence of mines, diamonds and oilfields in the cell; latitude and longitude of the cell
centroid, cell area, distance of the centroid to the capital, the coast and the border plus dummies for cells
crossed by the country border, cells on the coast and cells hosting the country capital; number of cities in the
cell, dummies for level-2 administrative units (typically districts); travel time to the closest city with more
than 50,000 inhabitants, km of primary and secondary roads, of paved primary roads and primary roads in
good conditions; km of electrical grid; infant mortality rate; average temperature and precipitation; number
of years of drought over the period; average distance to the closest cell incurring a drought over the period,
plus dummies for missing values of all these variables. Summary statistics for these variables are reported
in Table 1, while Table A.1 reports their definition and original source. Note that these variables, except
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errors are clustered by cell. In the regressions we exclude the few observations for which we have
no information on population or GDP growth. This gives a total of 152,415 observations.22
The dependent variable in all regressions is the log number of protests (plus 1 to account for
zeros) per 100,000 population. In columns (1) and (2) we present OLS estimates of model (4.1)
where we only include mobile phone coverage, i.e. we constrain the coefficient β2 to zero. We
find, on average, no effect of greater mobile phone coverage on protests incidence (coefficient
0.003). Results remain virtually unchanged when we include the entire set of controls in column
(2). If, as speculated in the introduction (and discussed theoretically in Appendix B), mobile
phones are instrumental to mass political mobilization only when the economy is performing
sufficiently poorly, then it should be no surprise that, given the sustained continental growth
over this period (4.9 percent), one finds no effect of mobile phone coverage on protests.
In the remaining columns of Table 2, we thus explore the heterogeneous effects of coverage on
protests provision at different levels of economic growth and in particular we investigate whether
mobile phones trigger political mobilization only during economic downturns. To this end, in
columns (3) and (4) we start by introducing the interaction between mobile phone coverage
and GDP growth. Here we constrain the coefficient on coverage to vary linearly across the
economic cycle, although we also experiment below with a less parametric approach. Focusing
on the most saturated specification in column (4), we find that, at zero GDP growth, higher
coverage leads to a sizeable and statistically significant increase in protests.23 Moving from
an area with no coverage to one fully covered leads to an increase in protests per capita of
around 9 percent. Interestingly, differences in protest activity between areas with different
rates of coverage increase during recessions. A 1 s.d. fall in GDP growth (0.04) is associated,
for example, to an increase in the protest activity differential between areas with full and with
no coverage on the order of an additional 7 percent (1.873 x 0.04).
One concern with the estimates of model (4.1) is that we are constraining the coefficient on
coverage to vary linearly along the economic cycle. A related issue is that estimates in Table
2 imply, by extrapolation, that the protests differential between high- and low-coverage areas
should fall for sufficiently high levels of economic growth. In order to address both of these
issues and to add further transparency to our regression analysis, in Figure 4 we report the effect
of coverage on protests at different levels of economic growth, estimated non-parametrically. In
practice, here we present separate estimates and the associated confidence intervals for the effect
of coverage on protests at five intervals of the GDP growth distribution.24 There are three main
population (which is available every 5 years and which we interpolate linearly across these 5-year intervals
using logs) and a variable measuring the occurrence of civil conflict, only vary cross-sectionally.
22 In particular we have no information for GDP growth for Djibouti from 2008 to 2012 and for Libya from 1998
to 1999 and from 2010 to 2012. We also have no information on population for 41 cells (32 in Egypt, 2 in
South Africa, 4 in Tanzania and 3 in Uganda).
23 Note that while the coefficient on coverage in columns (1) and (2) is evaluated at average GDP growth, the
one in columns (3) and (4) is evaluated at zero GDP growth. This is simply a normalisation that does not
affect the estimates of β2.
24 In particular, we run a pooled regression similar to the one in equation (4.1), where we constrain the
coefficient β2 to zero and we allow the coefficient β1 to vary unrestricted for levels of GDP of between
(−∞,−0.025]; (−0.025, 0]; (0, 0.025]; (0.025, 0.05]; (0.05,∞].
18
findings that emerge from this Figure. First, the effect of coverage on protests varies roughly
linearly with GDP growth; second, a significant effect is only found at the bottom of the GDP
growth distribution; third, effects at the top of the GDP growth distribution are close to zero.
Taken together, the evidence in Figure 4 suggests that the linear specification in equation (4.1)
is a good approximation to the data and - more importantly - that it is only during recessions
that the protest differential between high- and low-coverage areas arises.
In order to validate the results from GDELT, in columns (5) to (8) of Table 2 we report the
same regression estimates based on ACLED. Patterns of estimates are very similar to those
found in GDELT. If one focuses on the most saturated specifications in column (8), results
show once more that mobile phones amplify the effect of economic downturns on protests.
The coefficient on the interaction term between GDP growth and coverage is negative (-0.393),
implying that a 4 p.p. fall in GDP growth is associated with an increase in the differential in the
yearly incidence of protests between an area with full coverage and an area without coverage of
between 1.6 and 2.2 percent, around one fourth of the effect found in GDELT. Differently from
GDELT, we find no statistically significant effect of coverage on protests at zero GDP growth
(coefficient 0.019).25
In sum, although point estimates based on ACLED are typically smaller in magnitude than
those found based on GDELT, as well as typically less precise - which is reasonable given
the much smaller number of observations - remarkably results based on the two datasets are
qualitatively similar. In both cases we conclude that, in our sample of countries and years,
characterized by strong average economic growth (4.9 percent), greater coverage did not lead
per se to greater protest incidence. We find however, that mobile phone coverage played a
significant role in magnifying the effect of recessions on protest occurrence, with an effect that
is both statistically and economically significant.
5.2. Aggregate outcomes: 2SLS
In order to deal with the potential endogeneity of coverage with respect to protests, in this
section we turn to the 2SLS estimates which exploit the differential trends in mobile phone
adoption across areas with different average flash intensity as an instrument for coverage. Figure
A.7 reports number of flash ground strikes between 1995 and 2010 in each of the 0.5◦ x 0.5◦
cells for the whole of Africa.26,27 The continent has the highest flash density on Earth, with an
25We have also replicated Figure 4 using data from ACLED. Results are qualitatively very similar, although
- due to the smaller sample size - point estimates at different levels of GDP growth are never individually
statistically significant.
26 Data on average number of flashes over this period come from the Global Hydrology and Climate Center
(GHCC), which makes publicly available the data collected by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) through space-based sensors (Cecil et al. 2014). Flashes are recorded along with
their spatial location (latitude, longitude) with a level of resolution of at least 10 km on the ground. Data are
available at http://www.thunder.msfc.nasa.gov.
27 Note that for identification we only exploit differences in average flash intensity across areas. There is robust
evidence that local flash intensity is very persistent over time (Andersen et al. 2012). In practice we exploit the
circumstance that areas with high average flash intensity tend to experience slower adoption of mobile phone
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average of 17.3 flashes per km2 per year, compared to a world average of 2.9 (Cecil et al. 2014).
One can also see that there is substantial variation in lightning intensity across areas, suggesting
that this instrument has the potential to generate useful variation in the rate of mobile phone
adoption across cells.28
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report estimates of the first-stage equations. As we have
effectively two endogenous variables (coverage and its interaction with GDP growth) and two
exogenous variables (Z and its interaction with GDP growth), we can gain in efficiency by
instrumenting each endogenous variable with the two instruments (see footnote 19). We only
present regression results with the entire set of controls as in even-numbered columns of Table
2. Estimates in column (1) show that greater flash activity leads to a slower adoption of mobile
phone technology: a 1 s.d. increase in the number of flashes per year (0.43) leads to a lower
growth in coverage of around 0.43 p.p. a year (-0.43 x 0.010), i.e. a differential growth of around
6.5 p.p. over the entire 15-year period.29
Column (2) reports regression estimates where the dependent variable is the interaction be-
tween Cov and ∆GDP . For the model to be well specified one will expect the coefficient of
Z in column (1) to be similar to the coefficient of Z ∆GDP in column (2). Indeed, these
coefficients are very similar in magnitude (-0.015 compared to -0.010). The values of an F-test
that the 2SLS estimates are biased towards the OLS due to a weak instruments problem are
reported at the bottom of the table and one can see that the null is systematically rejected.30
Before presenting the 2SLS estimates and in order to add transparency to the identification
strategy, in the following we present graphical evidence on the raw correlation between protests
and the instrument, i.e. on the reduced-form equation:
y¯jct = ρ0 + ρ1 Zjct + ρ2 ∆GDP ct Zjct + fjc + fct + ζjct (5.1)
where ρk = βkδ1, k = 1, 2.
For protests to respond negatively to the state of the economic cycle when coverage increases
(β2 < 0 in equation 4.1) and given that coverage varies negatively with the instrument (δ1 < 0
in equation 4.2), one will expect the protests’ differential between areas with high and low
flash intensity (hence with low and high coverage) to be positively correlated with GDP growth
(i.e. ρ2 > 0). Figure 5 reports the within-country change in the differential in log protests
(measured in GDELT) between high (in the top quartile of the continent distribution) and low
technology. Although one might be tempted to use year-to-year variation in lighting intensity within cells,
as abnormally high (low) lighting activity in one year might delay (accelerate) adoption, unfortunately there
is no information - from NASA or other sources - on trends in lighting activity at such level of geographical
detail.
28 The peak annual number of flashes is in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with almost half a million flashes
per year in each cell, or about a flash every 2 days for each km2. Cells in a broad region of central Africa
exceed 100,000 flashes per year while those in most land regions in the tropics and subtropics - except for
arid regions - exceed 70,000 flashes per year.
29 The estimated coefficient is virtually identical if we regress coverage on Z and we set the coefficient on
∆GDP X Z to zero , as in equation (4.2).
30 We report the value of the Angrist-Pischke test for the case of multiple endogenous variables (Angrist &
Pischke 2008).
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(in the bottom quartile) flash intensity areas in each year, alongside average growth in GDP.31
Indeed, one can notice a very strong positive correlation between the two series: in particular,
the temporary increase in GDP growth in the mid 2000s is associated with a sizeable temporary
increase in the protest differential between high- and low-flash intensity areas.32,33
We now turn to the 2SLS estimates. These are reported in columns (3) to (6) of Table 3. The
first two columns refer to GDELT while the subsequent two columns refer to ACLED. As for
the first-stage, we only report results with the entire set of controls. Similar to the specifications
in Table 2 we start by constraining the coefficient β2 in (4.1) to zero . Results are qualitatively
very similar to the OLS: on average, we find a small and statistically insignificant effect of
mobile phone coverage on protests. Results in the remaining columns confirm that protests
respond more to economic downturns in more covered areas: a 1 s.d. fall in GDP growth leads
to an increase in the per capita protest differential between areas with full and with no coverage
of between 7 (-1.713 x 0.04) and 25 percent (-6.325 x 0.04), with the estimates being larger in
GDELT compared to ACLED.34
The bottom row of Table 3 reports the p-value for an endogeneity test for coverage and its
interaction with GDP growth. We are able to marginally reject the hypothesis that coverage
and its interaction with GDP growth are simultaneously exogenous to the dependent variable
in GDELT (p-value 0.055), but we cannot reject exogeneity based on ACLED data (p-value
0.223).
Although first-stage estimates and the evidence in Figure 5 show that the rank condition
is satisfied, clearly this is not informative about the validity of the exclusion restriction. As
discussed above, for this restriction to hold, one will expect, conditional on the included controls,
the effect of the instrument and its interaction with GDP growth on protests to act only through
the availability of mobile phone technology. As said, for the exclusion restriction to hold, one
would expect the coefficient ρ2, i.e. the protest differential between high- and low-flash-intensity
areas to be equal to zero in a period when there was no mobile phone technology. We test for
this using data on protests from GDELT since 1990, i.e. before the spread of mobile phone
technology in Africa (note instead that ACLED data are only available starting in 1997).
31 These are weighted averages across countries with weights equal to the country’s population. Note that GDP
growth in this figure is slightly different from what is reported in Figure 3 that refers to all countries in the
sample, rather than only to those with sufficient within-country variation in flash intensity.
32 A regression coefficient of the protest differential on GDP growth with weights equal to population delivers a
coefficient of 2.518, (s.e. 1.056, significant at 10 percent level). More subtly, as the coefficient ρ2 captures the
interaction between flashes, a linear trend and GDP growth, one will expect this correlation to change over
time and in particular to show an upward trend. Indeed three separate regressions by sub-periods (1998-2002,
2003-2007, 2008-2012) deliver the following three coefficients: -1.367 (s.e. 4.535), 3.927 (s.e. 4.198) and 4.711
(s.e. 7.414). Although not individually significant, these coefficients follow precisely the expected pattern.
33 In Figure A.9 we also report the reduced-form coefficient of protests on the instrument ρ1. We do not find any
evidence of the instrument directly affecting protests per capita throughout the period, consistent with the
2SLS estimates of coefficient β1 in equation (4.1) not being different from zero. Note that this figure remains
virtually unchanged if we constrain the coefficient ρ2 in equation (5.1) to zero.
34 Results are also very similar if we use flash density per km2 as instrument, although F-stats are marginally
lower. We also use the interaction of the continent-wide trend in coverage (as opposed to a parametric linear
trend) with flash rates (flashes per km2), finding overall very similar results.
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Figure 6, top panel, reports average mobile phone coverage across the continent between 1990
and 2012.35 Coverage is zero in 1990 and it grows starting from 1996. Growth after that is
basically linear, with a slight slowdown starting in the mid 2000s. The bottom panel of Figure
6 presents OLS estimates of ρ2 in (5.1), separately by sub-periods, using the most saturated
specification as in columns (4) and (8) of Table 2, i.e. with the inclusion of cell fixed effects,
country X year effects and cell-level time-varying controls. One can see that there is no effect
of the instrument interacted with GDP growth on protests in the early period, i.e. effectively
up to the late 1990s. Point estimates are small and not statistically significant at conventional
levels. Positive effects tend to manifest from the early 2000s, when coverage starts to increase,
and similar to the spread of coverage these effects follow an upward trend, with the gradient
once more flattening towards the end of the period.36
As an additional check for the exogeneity of the instrument we present OLS estimates of the
reduced-form equation (5.1) and 2SLS estimates of equation (4.1) where now the dependent
variable is a measure of local economic development. For this, we use light density measured by
satellites at night, a widely used measure in the literature (Henderson et al. 2012, Michalopou-
los & Papaioannou 2012), which has been shown to proxy well for local economic activity.37
Importantly, we find that local economic activity seems not to vary with the instrument and
its interaction with GDP growth (see Table A.4). Consistent with this, we find that the 2SLS
estimates for night lights are not statistically significant. These result suggest that the effect
of flash rates on the speed of mobile phone adoption across areas is not attributable to differ-
ential patterns of local economic growth, lending further credibility to the exclusion restriction
underlying the consistency of the 2SLS estimates.
We have also performed a number of robustness checks on equation (4.1). First, as for the
OLS, we have allowed the coefficient on coverage to vary unrestricted at different levels of GDP
growth. 2SLS estimates are reported in Figure A.8. One can still observe a negative gradient
in the coefficients across levels of economic growth similar to the results for the OLS, although
admittedly estimates are less precise than the corresponding OLS.
Second, a number of additional checks are reported in Table A.5 and we briefly discuss
them here. In particular, we have clustered standard errors at the country rather than the
cell level: this should take into account any spatial correlation in the error term across cells
within a country (column 1). We have also attempted to control more flexibly for unobserved
determinants of protests that might be correlated with the instrument by interacting all cell-
35 To obtain this series we have used information on coverage from GSMA (available since 1998). We also
exploit the circumstance that 2G technology was not introduced in Africa until 1995 and for each cell we
derive a predicted measure of coverage by linear interpolation between 1995 and 1998. The series plots the
population-weighted average coverage across the continent in each year.
36 Note that in these regressions we allow the coefficients on the interaction between the cross-sectional charac-
teristics and the linear time trend to vary between the pre-1998 and post-1998 period. We do so to make sure
that this specification is consistent with the reduced-form specification associated with our main estimates
for the 1998-2012 period.
37 Following Lowe (2014) and Henderson et al. (2012), we calculate the mean luminosity for each cell/year
excluding cells with persistent lighting due to gas flares. Results are similar if these observations are not
removed from the sample.
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level cross-sectional characteristics with country-specific (as opposed to continent-wide) linear
trends (column 2). As said, one concern is that GDELT might fail to successfully de-duplicate
protests in the data when reported in different articles or outlets, hence increasing the rate of
false positives. We address this issue by constructing an alternative measure of protests, i.e. a
variable that takes a value of 1 if at least one protest event is recorded in a certain location in
a certain day, treating events in the same location but classified as different in the data as a
single event (column 3). Finally we have run regressions where instead of using the logarithm
of protests per capita plus a constant (1) in order to account for zeros, we use the square root of
protests per capita (column 4). We do so because of the concern that our results in Table 3 are
sensitive to the value of the constant used. Clearly point estimates from these last regressions
need not to be the same as those from our main regressions, although their sign has to be the
same.38 All these checks make no substantial difference to our results.
In Table A.6 we have investigated whether our 2SLS results are driven by specific samples
or periods.39 Estimates of the coefficient on the interaction term β2 are consistently negative
across samples, although not always individually significant. In most cases, it also appears hard
to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same across subsamples. If anything, it
appears that the effects are greater in large relative to small cities and in Sub-Saharan Africa
compared to northern Africa. We also restrict to the pre-2011 period out of a concern that our
results are driven by the Arab Spring, something for which we find no evidence (see columns 5
and 6). We also do not find evidence that our results are driven by either the availability of the
Internet, or of 3G technology (columns 7 to 10).40 It appears, however, that effects are larger
under autocratic regimes and in particular when the media are captured (columns 11 to 14).41
In sum, we have exploited the differential penetration of mobile phone coverage across areas
with different flash intensity to identify the causal effect of mobile phones on protests. A number
of tests lend strong support to our hypothesis that the instrument is excludable. 2SLS estimates
of model (4.1) confirm that at average growth, mobile phones have no independent effect on
protests, although they tend to amplify the positive effect of recessions on the incidence of
protests. Although 2SLS estimates are larger in absolute value compared to the OLS estimates,
we also show that, once we control for a very large number of cell-level characteristics, it is hard
to tell these estimates apart, at least in ACLED.
38 Note in fact that dY 0.5
dX
≈ 12Y 0.5 dlnYdX .39 In order to obtain more precise 2SLS estimates, we constrain the first-stage estimates to be the ones from the
pooled sample in Table 3. We compute standard errors manually, in the spirit of a split-sample IV technique
(Angrist & Krueger 1995). In particular estimates of the variance covariance matrix of the 2SLS estimates can
be obtained using the following formula: (Z′Ω−1X)−1(
∑
c
ZcΩ−1c ûcû′cΩ−1c Z′c)(X ′Ω−1Z)−1, where Z denotes
the matrix of the instruments (including a constant), X the matrix of the endogenous variables (also including
a constant), Ω is the matrix of weights and û are the 2SLS residuals. Variables denoted by the subscript c
refer to sub-matrices and sub-vectors for each cell c.
40 Internet availability is defined for penetration greater or equal to 3 percent of the population, based on data
from the World Development Indicators. 3G mobile phone technology is calculated for each cell, based on
data from the GMSA.
41 Autocracy is defined by a score on the Polity2 indicator less or equal to zero . Media are considered captured
if their score falls below the world median in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index.
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5.3. Individual participation in protests: channels of impact
In this section we turn to individual data from the Afrobarometer to further investigate the
effect of coverage and its interaction with GDP growth on participation in protests. Micro-
data from the Afrobarometer have two major advantages. Firstly, they allow us to validate
results from GDELT and ACLED, and in particular to rule out that these results are driven
by systematic reporting error. Secondly, and more importantly, they allow us to investigate the
potential mechanisms of impact.
In addition to information on individual participation in protests, Afrobarometer data also
provide information on individual mobile phone use, although this variable is only available for
round 5 of the survey. We use this piece of information and a regression model to predict, for
each individual in the sample, the probability of using a mobile phone at least once a day as
a function of individual characteristics and a measure of cell-level coverage from GSMA. The
exact procedure is discussed in Appendix A.
In the rest of this section we ignore the non-random allocation of coverage across areas,
i.e. we revert to the OLS estimates in section 4.1. The reason for this is that data from the
Afrobarometer only span over a limited number of cells/years and in addition these are con-
centrated towards the end of the period, when one can show that the instrument has relatively
little bite on the endogenous variable. Indeed, first-stage estimates of equation (4.2) for the
sample of cells/years covered by the Afrobarometer data are systematically insignificant. We
are reassured though by our findings in the previous sections that 2SLS provide - if anything -
conservative estimates of the effect of interest and by the observation above (that unsurprisingly
also holds for the Afrobarometer) that one cannot typically reject exogeneity of coverage and
its interaction with GDP with respect to protests.
As preliminary evidence, Table 4 reports regressions of a number of dependent variables that
reflect individuals’ knowledge and perception of economic and political conditions. The point
of this table is to shed light on how individuals respond to changes in economic conditions
depending on access to mobile phones. This paves the way to the subsequent analysis of the
effect of mobile phones on protest activity. All specifications include a dummy for mobile
phone ownership and its interaction with GDP growth. Regressions also include cell fixed
effects, country X year fixed effects and all cell-level controls plus an array of individual-level
covariates.42 The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy for the respondent’s self-
reported economic status, as proxied by non-employment. Dependent variables in columns (2)
and (3) are, respectively, dummies if the respondent’s self-reported perceptions of his own and
the country’s economic conditions are worse or much worse compared to 12 months before.
The dependent variable in column (4) is a dummy if the respondent reports not trusting the
country’s president while the dependent variable in column (5) is a dummy if the individual
disapproves of the actions of the president. Regressions are weighted by sampling weights and
42 These are: age and age squared, a gender dummy, educational dummies, a dummy for urban residence, and
number of adults in the household.
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standard errors are once more clustered by cell.
There are several findings that emerge from Table 4. We focus on the interaction between
GDP growth and mobile phone use. First, there is no evidence that individuals with mobile
phones are more vulnerable to economic conditions than those without mobile phones (see
columns 1 and 2). However, they appear to be more likely to report that the economy is doing
poorly when this is in fact happening compared to those with no mobile phones (column 3).
Consistent with plenty of evidence from elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Wolfers 2002) that
voters blame the government for poor economic performance, those with mobile phones are also
more likely to distrust and disapprove of the president when the economy does poorly (columns
4 and 5). In sum, Table 4 provides suggestive evidence that mobile phones make individuals
more informed about the state of the economy. It does not seem though that mobile phones
directly affect the opportunity cost of participation.
With this preliminary evidence at hand, we now turn to the effect of mobile phones on protests.
Table 5, columns (1) and (2), report OLS estimates of aggregate equation (4.1) based on data
from the Afrobarometer. Here the dependent variable is a dummy for protest participation. We
regress this variable on the fraction of individuals using a mobile phone (as opposed to coverage
in Table 2) in each cell X year and its interaction with GDP growth.43 We also experiment
below with regressions where the right-hand-side variable is mobile phone coverage as opposed
to the fraction of individuals using a mobile phone (as in Table 2). All specifications include cell
fixed effects plus country X year effects. Column (2) additionally controls for the same cell-level
covariates as in even-numbered columns of Table 2, as well as for individual-level covariates
available in the Afrobarometer. Regressions are weighted by the sum of sampling weights in
each cell. Standard errors are again clustered at the level of the cell.44 Similar to the results
in columns (4) and (8) of Table 2, we find that at zero GDP growth there is a modest positive
effect of the fraction of individuals using a mobile phone in society on the self-reported protest
participation. This effect ranges between 0.045 (with no controls) and 0.033 (including controls),
where only the former coefficient is significant at conventional statistical levels. Consistent with
the evidence from GDELT and ACLED we also find that mobile phone availability enhances
the effect of the economic cycle on protest participation. Point estimates in row 2 suggest that
a 1 s.d. fall in GDP growth is associated with an increase of around 4 p.p. in the protest
differential between areas with full and zero coverage (-1.066 x 0.04). At a baseline protest
participation of around 12 p.p. this is equivalent to an increase or around 33 percent. This is a
sizeable effect, not much different from the effect found on GDELT and ACLED for the same
sample, or on Afrobarometer when using coverage instead of fraction of people using a mobile
43 Note that because the right-hand side variables only vary by cell/year this is equivalent to a weighted regression
where the dependent variable is the fraction of individuals participating in a protest (as opposed to log number
of protests in Table 2).
44 It is worth remarking that OLS estimates of model (4.1) based on GDELT and ACLED on the sample of
cells/years available in the Afrobarometer are qualitatively similar to the ones based over the entire sample
(compare Tables 2 and A.8). If anything, point estimates of the parameter of interest β2 are larger in this
restricted sample than in the entire sample.
25
phone (see Table A.8). Importantly, results form the Afrobarometer are qualitatively in line
with those from GDELT and ACLED, suggesting that systematic misreporting is not driving
our estimates in section 5.1.
With this evidence in mind we finally turn to the individual determinants of protest partic-
ipation. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 report estimates of equation (4.3), i.e a regression of
a dummy for individual protest participation on a dummy for mobile phone use, the fraction
of individuals in a cell protesting, and the interaction of a dummy for mobile phone use with
this latter variable and with GDP growth. As explained, we use an instrumental variable ap-
proach in order to obtain consistent estimates of the model. First-stage estimates, which are
very similar to those reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, are reported in Table A.9.
There are several important findings that emerge. First, individuals with mobile phones are
effectively equally likely to protest conditional on others’ participation and the state of the
economy compared to those without mobile phones (γ1 = 0). Second, conditional on others’
participation, individuals with mobile phones are more likely to respond to changes in economic
conditions than those without mobile phones (γ2 < 0). A 1 s.d. fall in GDP growth leads to a
differential increase in protest participation among those with mobile phones compared to those
without of around 1 p.p. (this is -0.263 x 0.04). This is consistent with evidence in Table 4 that
individuals with mobile phones are better informed about the state of the economy and hence
more likely to react to changes in aggregate economic conditions. Third, there is very clear
evidence of positive spillovers in the provision of protests (γ3 > 0). We estimate that a 10 p.p.
increase in average protest participation in society leads to an increase in protest participation
among those with no mobile phones on the order of 8 p.p. (0.799 x 0.10). Fourth, there is
evidence that those with mobile phones are more responsive to an increase in others’ protest
participation than those with no mobile phones (γ4 > 0). This seems to suggest that mobile
phones are complementary to others’ participation in the decision to join a protest. We find
an additional increase in the probability of participation among those with mobile phones of
around 2.6 p.p.45 In sum, results in Table 5 suggest that both enhanced coordination (γ4 > 0)
and enhanced information (γ2 < 0) contribute to explain why mobile phones tend to amplify
the effect of economic downturns on protests.
With the estimates of model (4.3) at hand, we can also attempt to quantify the contribution
of these two different mechanisms. Our estimates suggest that between 46 and 79 percent of the
overall effect is ascribable to increased coordination, with the residual attributable to increased
information.46
45 Recall that for the equilibrium to be stable, we expect (γ3 + γ4 d¯) < 1. As the overall fraction of individuals
using a mobile phone is 0.67, this condition holds in the data.
46 See Appendix B for details of the calculation. To operationalize this we use estimates of γ2, γ3 and γ4 from
Table 5, columns (3) and (4). We derive estimates of the effect of GDP growth alone on protests (conditional
on all other covariates) from an estimate of equation (4.3), where we do not include year X country dummies.
Estimates vary between -0.130 and -0.052 depending on whether we exclude or we include controls (respectively
as in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. The role of enhanced information varies between 46 and 79 percent
depending on whether we use parameter estimates from the model without or with controls.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper we provide novel systematic evidence on the impact of mobile phone technology
on mass political mobilization. Using detailed geo-referenced data for Africa from three dif-
ferent sources on protest incidence and self-reported protest participation, we find strong and
robust evidence in support of a nuanced and qualified version of the “liberation technology”
argument. Mobile phones are indeed instrumental to political mobilization, but this happens
during periods of economic downturn, when reasons for grievance emerge or the opportunity
cost of participation falls.
Using a combination of theory and micro-data we are able to shed light on the behavioral
channels behind this empirical result. We show that mobile phones play two roles in fostering
political participation during economic downturns: on the one hand, they appear to make
individuals more informed about the state of the economy; on the other, they also appear to
make people more responsive to changes in others’ participation, which is key in determining
the equilibrium level of protests via strategic complementarities. Empirically, we find that both
effects are at play.
While our results refer largely to a period when the only technology available was 2G, the
increasingly ubiquitous availability of 3G and 4G technology and the associated advent of so-
cial media - both of which seem to further facilitate coordination among citizens - lead us to
believe that the potential for digital ICT to foster mass political movements will - if anything
- increase in the future. This argument squares well with evidence - discussed in the paper -
that participation in social movements and mass political mobilization have been globally on
the rise, and that this has happened against the backdrop of impending economic slowdown or
outright recessions.
Results in the paper also indicate that mobile phones seem to be particularly effective in fos-
tering mobilization in autocratic regimes and where traditional media are captured, suggesting
that this technology may play a key role in fostering political freedom.
27
References
Acemoglu, D., Hassan, T. A. & Tahoun, A. (2014), ‘The Power of the Street: Evidence from
Egypt’s Arab Spring’, NBER Working Paper (No. 20665).
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2001), ‘A Theory of Political Transitions’, American Economic
Review 91(4), 938–963.
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2006), Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,
Cambridge University Press.
Afrobarometer (2011), Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey Manual, http://www.afrobarometer.org.
Ahn, H. & Lee, M.-H. (1999), ‘An Econometric Analysis of the Demand for Access to Mobile
Telephone Networks’, Information Economics and Policy 11(3), 297–305.
Aidt, T. S. & Franck, R. (2015), ‘Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence
from the Great Reform Act of 1832’, Econometrica 83(2), 505–547.
Aker, J. C. (2010), ‘Information from Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agricultural
Markets in Niger’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2(3), 46–59.
Aker, J. C., Collier, P. & Vicente, P. C. (2015), ‘Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones
and Free Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique’, CGD Working Paper (No. 328).
Aker, J. C. & Mbiti, I. M. (2010), ‘Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa’,
Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(3), 207–232.
Andersen, T. B., Bentzen, J., Dalgaard, C.-J. & Selaya, P. (2011), ‘Does the Internet Reduce
Corruption? Evidence from US States and across Countries’, World Bank Economic Review
25(3), 387–417.
Andersen, T. B., Bentzen, J., Dalgaard, C.-J. & Selaya, P. (2012), ‘Lightning, IT Diffusion, and
Economic Growth across US States’, Review of Economics and Statistics 94(4), 903–924.
Angrist, J. D. & Krueger, A. B. (1995), ‘Split-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimates of the
Return to Schooling’, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 13(2), 225–235.
Angrist, J. D. & Pischke, J.-S. (2008), Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s compan-
ion, Princeton University Press.
Berazneva, J. & Lee, D. R. (2013), ‘Explaining the African Food Riots of 2007-2008: An
Empirical Analysis’, Food Policy 39, 28–39.
Besley, T. & Burgess, R. (2002), ‘The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory
and Evidence from India’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1415–1451.
28
Blattman, C. & Miguel, E. (2010), ‘Civil War’, Journal of Economic Literature 48(1), 3–57.
Bond, R. M., Fariss, C. J., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. D., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E. & Fowler,
J. H. (2012), ‘A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization’,
Nature 489(7415), 295–298.
Brückner, M. & Ciccone, A. (2011), ‘Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity’, Econo-
metrica 79(3), 923–947.
Buys, P., Dasgupta, S., Thomas, T. S. & Wheeler, D. (2009), ‘Determinants of a Digital Divide
in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Spatial Econometric Analysis of Cell Phone Coverage’, World
Development 37(9), 1494–1505.
Campante, F. R. & Chor, D. (2012a), ‘Schooling, Political Participation, and the Economy’,
Review of Economics and Statistics 94(4), 841–859.
Campante, F. R. & Chor, D. (2012b), ‘Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution?
Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring’, Journal of Economic Perspectives
26(2), 167–187.
Castells, M. (2011), The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society,
and Culture, Vol. 1, John Wiley & Sons.
Cecil, D. J., Buechler, D. E. & Blakeslee, R. J. (2014), ‘Gridded Lightning Climatology from
TRMM-LIS and OTD: Dataset Description’, Atmospheric Research 135, 404–414.
Chwe, M. S.-Y. (1999), ‘Structure and Strategy in Collective Action’, American Journal of
Sociology 105(1), 128–156.
Collier, P. (2000), Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy, World
Bank, Washington, DC.
DellaVigna, S. & Gentzkow, M. (2010), ‘Persuasion: Empirical Evidence’, Annual Review of
Economics 2(1), 643–669.
DellaVigna, S. & Kaplan, E. (2007), ‘The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 122(3), 1187–1234.
Diamond, L. (2010), ‘Liberation Technology’, Journal of Democracy 21(3), 69–83.
DiPasquale, D. & Glaeser, E. L. (1998), ‘The Los Angeles Riot and the Economics of Urban
Unrest’, Journal of Urban Economics 43(1), 52–78.
Dube, O. & Vargas, J. F. (2013), ‘Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from
Colombia’, The Review of Economic Studies 80(4), 1384–1421.
29
Durante, R., Pinotti, P. & Tesei, A. (2015), ‘The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV’, CEPR
Discussion Paper (No. 10738).
Enikolopov, R., Makarin, A. & Petrova, M. (2015), ‘Social Media and Protest Participation:
Evidence from Russia’, mimeo .
Enikolopov, R., Petrova, M. & Zhuravskaya, E. (2011), ‘Media and Political Persuasion: Evi-
dence from Russia’, American Economic Review 101(7), 3253–3285.
Falck, O., Gold, R. & Heblich, S. (2014), ‘E-lections: Voting Behavior and the Internet’, Amer-
ican Economic Review 104(7), 2238–2265.
Foster, V. & Briceno-Garmendia, C. (2011), Africa’s ICT Infrastructure: Building on the Mobile
Revolution, World Bank Publications.
Gentzkow, M. (2006), ‘Television and Voter Turnout’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
121(3), 931–972.
Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M. & Sinkinson, M. (2011), ‘The Effect of Newspaper Entry and
Exit on Electoral Politics’, American Economic Review 101(7), 2980–3018.
Gerber, A. S., Karlan, D. & Bergan, D. (2009), ‘Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment
Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions’, American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(2), 35–52.
Gladwell, M. (2010), ‘Small Change’, The New Yorker 4(2010), 42–49.
Granovetter, M. (1978), ‘Threshold Models of Collective Behavior’, American Journal of Soci-
ology 84(6), 1420–1443.
Gruber, H. & Verboven, F. (2001), ‘The Diffusion of Mobile Telecommunications Services in
the European Union’, European Economic Review 45(3), 577–588.
GSMA (2012), ‘GSMA Network Coverage Maps - Submission Guide January 2012’, London:
GSMA.
Gwilliam, K., Foster, V., Archondo-Callao, R., Briceño-Garmendia, C., Nogales, A. & Sethi,
K. (2008), ‘The Burden of Maintenance: Roads in Sub-Saharan Africa’, AICD Background
Paper (No. 14).
Harari, M. & La Ferrara, E. (2013), ‘Conflict, Climate and Cells: A Disaggregated Analysis’,
CEPR Discussion Paper (No. 9277).
Henderson, J. V., Storeygard, A. & Weil, D. N. (2012), ‘Measuring economic growth from outer
space’, The American Economic Review 102(2), 994.
30
Howard, P. N., Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W. & Mazaid, M. (2011), ‘Opening
Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?’, PITPI
Working Paper (No. 2011.1).
ITU (2003), ‘K.60 - Series K: Protection Against Interference-Emission Limits and Test Meth-
ods for Telecommunication Networks’, ICT Data and Statistics, Division Telecommunication
Development Bureau, International Telecommunication Union .
ITU (2015), ‘The World in 2014: ICT Facts and Figures’, ICT Data and Statistics, Division
Telecommunication Development Bureau, International Telecommunication Union .
Jack, W., Ray, A. & Suri, T. (2013), ‘Transaction Networks: Evidence from Mobile Money in
Kenya’, The American Economic Review 103(3), 356–361.
Jack, W. & Suri, T. (2014), ‘Risk Sharing and Transactions Costs: Evidence from Kenya’s
Mobile Money Revolution’, The American Economic Review 104(1), 183–223.
Jackson, M. O. & Yariv, L. (2006), ‘Diffusion on Social Networks’, Economie Publique/Public
Economics 16, 3–16.
Jackson, M. O. & Yariv, L. (2007), ‘Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network
Games’, American Economic Review 97(2), 92–98.
Jensen, R. (2007), ‘The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance, and
Welfare in the South Indian Fisheries Sector’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3), 879–
924.
Leetaru, K. & Schrodt, P. A. (2013), ‘GDELT: Global Data on Events, Location, and Tone,
1979-2012’, International Studies Association Annual Conference .
Lowe, M. (2014), ‘Night Lights and ArcGIS: A Brief Guide’, MIT University Working Paper .
Madestam, A., Shoag, D., Veuger, S. & Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2013), ‘Do Political Protests
Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
128(4), 1633–1685.
Manski, C. F. (1993), ‘Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem’,
The Review of Economic Studies 60(3), 531–542.
Michalopoulos, S. & Papaioannou, E. (2012), ‘National Institutions and Subnational Develop-
ment in Africa’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(1), 151–213.
Michalopoulos, S. & Papaioannou, E. (2015), ‘The Long-run Effects of the Scramble for Africa’,
American Economic Review . (forthcoming).
Miguel, E. & Easterly, W. R. (2009), Africa’s Turn?, MIT Press.
31
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. & Sergenti, E. (2004), ‘Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An
Instrumental Variables Approach’, Journal of Political Economy 112(4), 725–753.
Morozov, E. (2012), The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, PublicAffairs.
Nunn, N. & Wantchekon, L. (2011), ‘The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa’,
American Economic Review 101(7), 3221–3252.
Olken, B. A. (2009), ‘Do Television and Radio Destroy Social Capital? Evidence from Indone-
sian Villages’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(4), 1–33.
Ortiz, I., Burke, S. L., Berrada, M. & Cortés, H. (2013), ‘World Protests 2006-2013’, Initiative
for Policy Dialogue and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Working Paper .
Pierskalla, J. H. & Hollenbach, F. M. (2013), ‘Technology and Collective Action: The Effect
of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa’, American Political Science Review
107(2), 207–224.
Ponticelli, J. & Voth, H.-J. (2011), ‘Austerity and Anarchy: Budget Cuts and Social Unrest in
Europe, 1919-2008’, CEPR Discussion Paper (No. 8513).
Raleigh, C., Linke, A., Hegre, H. & Karlsen, J. (2010), ‘Introducing ACLED - Armed Conflict
Location and Event Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 47(5), 651–660.
Reinikka, R. & Svensson, J. (2011), ‘The Power of Information in Public Services: Evidence
from Education in Uganda’, Journal of Public Economics 95(7), 956–966.
Rheingold, H. (2008), Mobile Media and Political Collective Action, in ‘Handbook of Mobile
Communication Studies’, MIT Press, chapter 17, p. 225.
Rohner, D., Thoenig, M. & Zilibotti, F. (2013), ‘Seeds of Distrust: Conflict in Uganda’, Journal
of Economic Growth 18(3), 217–252.
Sauter, M. (2006), Communication Systems for the Mobile Information Society, John Wiley &
Sons.
Schrodt, P. A. (2012), ‘Precedents, Progress, and Prospects in Political Event Data’, Interna-
tional Interactions 38(4), 546–569.
Shapiro, J. N. & Weidmann, N. B. (2015), ‘Is the Phone Mightier Than the Sword? Cellphones
and Insurgent Violence in Iraq’, International Organization 69(2), 247–274.
Shirky, C. (2011), ‘The Political Power of Social Media’, Foreign Affairs 90(1), 28–41.
Snyder Jr., J. M. & Strömberg, D. (2010), ‘Press Coverage and Political Accountability’, Journal
of Political Economy 118(2), 355–408.
32
Stork, C., Calandro, E. & Gillwald, A. (2013), ‘Internet Going Mobile: Internet Access and
Usage in Eleven African Countries’, Info 13(5), 34–51.
Strömberg, D. (2004), ‘Radio’s Impact on Public Spending’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
119(1), 189–221.
Strömberg, D. (2015), ‘Media Coverage and Political Accountability: Theory and Evidence’,
CEPR Discussion Paper (No. 10638).
Tollefsen, A. F., Strand, H. & Buhaug, H. (2012), ‘PRIO-GRID: A Unified Spatial Data Struc-
ture’, Journal of Peace Research 49(2), 363–374.
Ward, M. D., Beger, A., Cutler, J., Dickenson, M., Dorff, C. & Radford, B. (2013), ‘Comparing
GDELT and ICEWS Event Data’, Analysis 21, 267–297.
Wolfers, J. (2002), ‘Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections’, Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University Working Paper .
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT press.
World Bank (2012), World Development Indicators 2012, World Bank Publications.
Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2014), ‘Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Geno-
cide’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(4), 1947–1994.
33
Figure 1 Mobile phone coverage diffusion, Africa 1998-2012
Notes. The figure reports geo-referenced data on 2G coverage for all of Africa at 5-year intervals between 1998 and 2012.
Source: GSMA.
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Figure 3 The evolution of GDP growth and protests over time - Africa
Notes. The figure reports continent-wide log protests per 100,000 people (dashed line) and the rate of GDP
growth (dotted line) as a function of time. Continent-wide GDP growth is obtained as a population-weighted
average of GDP growth in each country.
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Figure 4 The effect of coverage on protests at different levels of GDP growth - OLS
Notes. The figure reports separate OLS estimates and the associated confidence intervals for
the effect of coverage on protests in GDELT at five intervals of the GDP growth distribution:
(−∞,−0.025]; (−0.025, 0]; (0, 0.025]; (0.025, 0.05]; (0.05,∞].
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Figure 5 Protests differential between high- and low-flash-intensity areas and GDP growth
Notes. The figure reports the within-country trend in the log protest differential between high- and low-flash-intensity
areas (dashed line) and the continent-wide rate of GDP growth (dotted line). Series are population-weighted averages
across countries. Observations only refer to countries-years for which there is sufficient variation in flash intensity
across areas (see also text for details).
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Figure 6 Placebo test
Panel A: Mobile phone coverage by sub-periods
Panel B: Reduced-form coefficients of Z ∆GDP by sub-periods
Notes. Panel A reports the continental trend in 2G mobile phone coverage by 3-year sub-periods. Coverage is
set at 0 for all cells before 1995 (the year in which 2G technology was first introduced in Africa) and is linearly
interpolated at the cell level between 1995 and 1998 (the first year in our data). Panel B reports the estimated
coefficients from the reduced-form regression of log protests per 100,000 people (plus 1 to account for zeros) on
the variable Z X ∆GDP (parameter ρ3 in equation 5.1) by 3-year sub-periods and the corresponding 90 percent
confidence intervals.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics: cell characteristics
Avg. Std. Dev.
Mobile Phone Coverage (percent) 0.43 0.42
Protests per 100, 000 pop.−GDELT 1.24 17.29
Protests per 100, 000 pop.−ACLED 0.08 0.688
Country GDP growth 0.049 0.041
Population (1000s) 84.32 266.78
Cities (number) 2.36 3.94
Border Distance (100 km) 1.73 1.47
Capital Distance (100 km) 3.57 3.35
Coast(dummy) 0.15 0.36
Primary Roads (100 km) 0.87 0.99
Primary Roads Paved (100 km) 0.49 0.72
Primary Roads Good Conditions (100 km) 0.26 0.49
Secondary Roads (100 km) 1.42 1.10
Electricity Network (100 km) 0.86 1.18
Travel T ime nearest city pop. ≥ 50K(hours) 4.21 3.69
Infant Mortality Rate (h) 8.91 3.71
Mountain (percent) 0.23 0.32
Forest (percent) 0.23 0.25
Irrigated (percent) 0.08 0.17
Diamonds (dummy) 0.03 0.18
Minerals (dummy) 0.22 0.42
Oil (percent) 0.13 0.33
Conflict (dummy) 0.19 0.39
Temperature (Celsius degrees) 23.12 4.25
Precipitation (mm.) 876.2 487.5
Drought (n. of years) 1.44 1.25
Avg. distance from drought (100 km) 1.74 0.56
Flash rate (100, 000 per cell per year) 0.513 0.426
Notes. The table reports descriptive statistics for each of the 10,409 cells of 0.5◦ x 0.5◦ degree
resolution that compose Africa (excluding Somalia). All data, except population in row 5, are
weighted by cell population. Row 1 reports the fraction of the population in reach of 2G mobile
signal. Rows 2 and 3 report the average number of protests in a year per 100,000 people, from
GDELT and ACLED respectively. Row 4 reports the country’s yearly growth in GDP per capita.
The residuals rows report cross-sectional physical, climatic, geographical and socio-economic char-
acteristics of each cell. Table A.1 reports the definition as well as the source of each of these
variables.
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Table 2 Mobile phones and protests. Aggregate regressions: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Protests - GDELT Protests - ACLED
Coverage 0.003 -0.004 0.089*** 0.094*** -0.006 -0.002 0.014 0.019
(0.022) (0.018) (0.032) (0.030) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
∆GDP X Coverage -1.627*** -1.873*** -0.388* -0.393*
(0.466) (0.445) (0.234) (0.230)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell-level Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415
Notes. The table reports separate OLS regressions of log protests per 100,000 people (plus 1 to account for zeros)
by cell and year (equation 4.1). Columns (1) to (4) refer to GDELT while columns (5) to (8) refer to ACLED.
All regressions include cell and country X year fixed effects. Regressions in columns (1), (2), (5), (6) constrain
the coefficient β2 to zero . Coverage is the fraction of each cell area covered by mobile phone signal in a given
year. ∆GDP is the country yearly GDP growth rate in a given year. Cell-level controls include log population
and a dummy for civil conflict in that year/cell plus the interaction between a linear time trend with a large
number of cross-sectional cell characteristics (fraction of the cell’s area covered by mountains, forests, oilfields
and irrigated land; dummies for the presence of mines, diamonds and oilfields in the cell; latitude and longitude
of the cell centroid, cell area, distance of the centroid to the capital, the coast and the border plus dummies for
cells crossed by the country border, cells on the coast and cells hosting the country capital; number of cities in
the cell, dummies for level-2 administrative units (typically districts); travel time to the closest city with more
than 50,000 inhabitants, km of primary and secondary roads, of paved primary roads and primary roads in good
conditions; km of electrical grid; infant mortality rate; average temperature and precipitation; number of years of
drought over the period; average distance to the closest cell incurring a drought over the period, plus dummies for
missing values of all these variables). All regressions are weighted by cell population. Standard errors clustered
at the level of cell reported in brackets. ∗ Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level, ∗∗ 95 percent
level, ∗∗∗ 99 percent level.
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Table 3 Mobile phones and protests. Aggregate regressions: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-stage 2SLS
Coverage ∆GDP
X Coverage
Protests - GDELT Protests - ACLED
Z -0.010*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.000)
∆GDP X Z 0.012 -0.015***
(0.012) (0.005)
Coverage -0.094 0.281 0.015 0.116
(0.263) (0.277) (0.106) (0.116)
∆GDP X Coverage -6.325*** -1.713*
(2.031) (0.917)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Angrist-Pischke F-stat 16.76 13.96 – – – –
Endogeneity Test – – 0.730 0.055 0.876 0.223
Observations 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) report first-stage regressions of Coverage and ∆GDP X Coverage on
average flash intensity in a cell interacted with a linear time trend (Z), and the interaction of this
variable with GDP growth. Columns (3) to (6) report 2SLS regressions of equation (4.1) based on
GDELT and ACLED. All specifications include cell and country X year fixed effects, plus the entire
set of cell-level controls as in even-numbered columns of Table 2. See also notes to Table 2.
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Table 4 Mobile phone use, economic conditions and political opinions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Worse Economic Conditions Opinion President
Individual Country
Actual Perceived Perceived Distrust Disapprove
Mobile -0.014 0.014 0.022* 0.044*** 0.026***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
∆GDP X Mobile -0.117 -0.173 -0.349** -0.624*** -0.350***
(0.139) (0.175) (0.167) (0.132) (0.109)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country X Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77,096 77,096 77,096 73,988 74,090
Notes. The table reports estimated coefficients based on individual-level OLS regressions
using data from Afrobarometer, rounds 3 to 5. Mobile is a dummy for mobile phone use.
See Appendix A for a definition and the method used to construct this variable. The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent: is unemployed (column 1);
thinks his own economic conditions have worsened during the previous year (2); thinks
the country’s economic conditions have worsened during the previous year (3); does not
trust the president at all (4); strongly disapproves of the president’s performance (5).
All regressions are weighted by sampling weights. Standard errors are clustered at the
cell level. All regressions include the entire set of cell-level controls described in notes to
Table 2, plus the following individual controls: age and its square, gender, rural/urban
status, dummies for education levels, and number of adults in the household. See also
notes to Table 2.
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Table 5 Mobile phones and protests. Aggregate (OLS) and individual level regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
%Participating Indiv. Participation (0/1)
%Mobile 0.045* 0.033
(0.024) (0.025)
∆GDP X %Mobile -1.066*** -0.720*
(0.351) (0.367)
Mobile -0.011 -0.015
(0.016) (0.017)
∆GDP X Mobile -0.239** -0.263**
(0.105) (0.104)
%Participating 0.904*** 0.799***
(0.161) (0.198)
%Participating X Mobile 0.208 0.259*
(0.149) (0.153)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country X Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell-level Controls No Yes No Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,082 2,082 75,175 75,175
Notes. The table reports coefficients from regressions estimated using Afrobarometer
data. Columns (1) and (2) report estimated coefficients from regressions of the fraction
of individuals participating in a cell/year on the fraction of individuals using a mobile
at least once a day and its interaction with GDP growth. Regressions weighted by cell
size. Columns (3) and (4) report estimated coefficients from regressions of a dummy for
participating in protests on a dummy for mobile phone use, the fraction of individuals
participating in the cell and interactions of a dummy for mobile phone use with this latter
variable and with GDP growth. Method of estimation in columns (3) and (4): 2SLS.
First-stage estimates reported in columns (2) and (4) of Table A.9. Standard errors
clustered by cell. See also notes to Table 2.
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A. Data appendix
A.1. GSMA
GSMA data are collected for the purpose of constructing a roaming coverage map service used
by network operators and users. The data that have been licensed to us provide separate infor-
mation on the availability of 2G, 3G and 4G technology. 2G technology improved over previous
technology by digital encryption of the signal, which allows for SMS, picture sharing and basic
Internet access. 3G and 4G technologies allow for broadband access. These technologies are
incremental in the data - 3G (4G) coverage is available only if 2G (3G) coverage was previously
available in a certain area. Only 2 percent of the continent population was in reach of the 3G
signal over the period, with this figure reaching a maximum of 6.3 percent in 2012. There was
virtually no 4G technology available in Africa over the period of observation. Our measure
of coverage is the fraction of population that lives within range of a mobile network signal,
regardless of whether they actually subscribe to the service or use it. In order to gauge an
understanding of what this implies in terms of mobile subscriptions, we compare our measure
of mobile phone penetration with data on the number of subscribers by country and year from
ITU (2015). Average coverage rate for the sample of country/year observations for which ITU
data are available is 49 percent versus 43 percent for the entire set of countries/years for which
GSMA data are available. The fraction of subscribers over population for this sample is 30
percent. A regression of the fraction of log subscribers over total population (plus 1 to allow
for zeros) on the log fraction of individuals covered by the 2G signal (plus 0.0001 to allow for
zeros), controlling for country and year fixed effects leads to an estimated coefficient of 0.30 (s.e.
0.02), implying that a 10 percent increase in coverage is associated with an increase in mobile
phone subscriptions of 3 percent.
A.2. GDELT and ACLED
Broadly speaking, data in GDELT refer to political events in the area of verbal and physical
mediation and conflict (Make a public statement, Consult, Threaten, Disapprove, etc.), includ-
ing protests but excluding events that form part of the routine political process, such as those
pertaining to elections, the legislative debate and government actions that do not fall into the
categories of mediation or conflict. The data are available at www.gdeltproject.org/data (data
downloaded on 30/01/2014). Events in GDELT come from both digitalized newspapers and
news agencies (Africa News, Agence France-Presse, Associated Press, Xinhua, BBC Monitor-
ing, The Washington Post, The New York Times...) as well as from web-based news aggregators
such as GoogleNews, which gathers around 4,000 media outlets (Leetaru & Schrodt 2013). The
data are extracted using an open-source coding algorithm, TABARI, or Textual Analysis by
Augmented Replacement Instructions, that sifts through news articles in search of actions and
actors available in CAMEO, the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations, a widely used
coding system in the field of political science that provides a list of around 15,000 actions and
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60,000 political actors. A precise location at the level of city or landmark is assigned to the
event using the GeoNames gazetteer, which includes over 10 million toponyms for 9 million
places with 5.5 million alternate names in up to 200 languages (www.GeoNames.org). The data
also report information on the number of sources and articles that refer to the same event as
well as on the actors involved - both the source and the target - although the latter information
is missing for a large fraction of events. Importantly, the data do not provide any information
on the issue, the number of participants, the original news sources or the issue at stake. In
a comprehensive study of protests worldwide Ortiz et al. (2013) list, in order, the following
reasons for protests that occurred between 2006 and 2013: Economic justice and Anti-austerity,
Failure of political representation, Global justice, People’s rights. Most protests are against
national governments.
Since GDELT is a largely unutilized dataset and since we have no control on the algorithm
used to collect the data or the news sources effectively utilized, we compare information from
GDELT with another widely utilized, but much smaller, manually compiled dataset on unrest
in Africa, the ACLED. The dataset provides information on political violence during civil wars
or episodes of instability and state failure between 1997 and 2013, and as such it has been
used widely in the literature on civil conflict (e.g. Harari & La Ferrara 2013, Michalopoulos &
Papaioannou 2015, Pierskalla & Hollenbach 2013). However, events that are potential precursors
or critical junctures of conflict, like protests and riots during peaceful times, are also recorded.
We focus on these events, which represent around 20 percent of the total number of records
in ACLED. Events are manually compiled from local, regional, national and continental media
and are supplemented by NGO reports. The number of different sources used in ACLED has
increased from 72 in 1998 to 232 in 2012 (ACLED, 2012). Like in GDELT, no information is
available on the issue and the number of participants (although the data report the original
news source). Figure A.5 reports the evolution in protests per capita measured in GDELT and
ACLED, separately by country. As the scale of the different series varies across countries, we
report the residuals from regressions of log protests per capita (plus 1, to account for zeros)
on country dummies and year dummies. By taking residuals, we also account for differential
reporting probabilities across sources, countries and time. Despite the difference in scale (note
that the ranges of variation on the left- and right-hand axes are different), one can appreciate
a very strong positive correlation between the two series in most countries. In countries such
as Burkina Faso, Cape Verde and the Central African Republic, to name a few, one can see
that the series line up remarkably well. This is less true in other countries such as Algeria,
Benin or Lesotho. Note that the series in Figure A.5 refer to average protests per capita in
each country/year. As our analysis ultimately focuses on cells within countries, we also explore
the correlation between protests per capita from the different sources across these cells. Figure
A.6 reports on the vertical axis the intensity of protests per capita measured in GDELT and on
the horizontal axis the intensity of protests from ACLED. Both series are obtained as residuals
of logs of the relevant variables (plus 1 to account for zeros) on cell and country fixed effects,
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separately for each country. Regressions are weighted by population size. We superimpose
on the data an estimated regression line, separately for each country. The pooled regression
coefficient across all countries alongside the associated standard error clustered at the level of
cell is reported at the bottom of the figure. One can clearly see that, even within countries, there
is a very clear positive correlation between the two series. This is true in almost all countries,
and the pooled regression coefficient of protests from GDELT on protests from ACLED is 1.844
(s.e. 0.138). Taken together these figures suggest that, despite some unavoidable measurement
error, the two series convey very similar information.
A.3. Afrobarometer
In the analysis we use data from Afrobarometer, rounds 3 to 5, spanning from 2005 to 2013
(information on available data by country and round is reported in Table A.2). As a first step,
we have assigned individuals in Afrobarometer to the PRIO-GRID cells. The Afrobarometer
provides information on individuals’ country, district and town/village of residence. The quality
of information varies across rounds and countries.
We match observations in the Afrobarometer to data from GeoNames. We restrict to popu-
lated places in GeoNames (i.e. we exclude, for example, mountains or lakes), defined as towns,
villages or other places where people live and work. GeoNames also provides alternate names
for each place, which are typically other names by which the place is known or the name in the
local language. We assign each populated place in a country to a PRIO-GRID cell based on its
coordinates. This gives a list of places with the associated PRIO-GRID cell.
Importantly, even within a country, the same place name in GeoNames can be shared by more
than one populated place, meaning that we cannot always uniquely assign a place name to a
cell. When two places share the same name and hence potentially belong to more than one cell,
we expand the dataset and we assign that place to each of these multiple cells. We construct an
adjustment factor for each observation in this dataset so that a place name X PRIO-GRID cell
has an associated weight equal to the relative population of a cell expressed as a fraction of the
total population among all cells to which that given place can potentially belong to. Clearly,
for cells that are univocally assigned to a cell this population, weight is equal to 1.
We start by matching observations in Afrobarometer based on their (country and) district
of residence to those in this newly created dataset using the first place name in GeoNames. If
an observation does not match, we match sequentially on the first, second and third alternate
place name in GeoNames. For unmatched observations, we proceed sequentially replicating the
same procedure but matching on town/village of residence in the Afrobarometer.
The resulting dataset has a number of observations larger than the original Afrobarometer,
as individuals whose place of residence can potentially belong to different cells will have as
many observations in the data as the potential cells of residence. Afrobarometer data include
sampling weights. We rescale sampling weights by the population weights described above. This
is equivalent to assuming that these individuals have been sampled at random among all those
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living in all the potential cells of residence and guarantees that the sum of weights in this new
dataset is the same as in the original Afrobarometer dataset.
In total we are able to assign 78,167 individuals in Afrobarometer to at least one PRIO-GRID
cell, or 81 percent of total respondents. Unmatched observations are those in the Afrobarometer
for which the district, town or village of residence cannot be found among the (main and first,
second and third alternate) list of populated place names in GeoNames. This can be either
because that place is genuinely missing in GeoNames or because of differences in spelling across
datasets. In total 49 percent of matched individuals have a unique cell identifier, while the rest
are assigned to at least two cells.
Column (1) of Table A.7 investigates the individual correlates of protest participation. Protest
participation increases and then decreases with age, peaking at age 36, increases with education
and is higher for males than for females.
We have also studied the within-cell correlation between self-reported protest participation in
Afrobarometer and the incidence of protests in both GDELT and ACLED. In order to do so, we
have computed the fraction of individuals reporting having participated in at least one protest
in each cell and year. We regress this fraction on a dummy equal to 1 if at least one protest
occurred in that cell/year plus the number of protests (separately from GDELT and ACLED).
The coefficient on the first variable captures the increase in participation associated with the
first protest occurring, while the coefficient on the second variable captures the marginal increase
in participation for each additional protest. If everybody who participates in one protest also
participates in all other protests, the coefficient on the second variable will be 0. Regressions
include cell fixed effects plus the interaction between year and country dummies and are weighted
by the sum of Afrobarometer sampling weights in each cell/year. Standard errors are clustered
by cell. Point estimates on a dummy for positive number of protest are 0.012 (i.e. 0.008) and
0.015 (s.e. 0.008) when using GDELT and ACLED respectively. We find small and statistically
insignificant effects on the variable “number of protests” in both datasets. Taken together,
these results imply that indeed protest incidence as measured in both GDELT and ACLED is
associated to an increase in protest participation in Afrobarometer (of between 1.2 and 1.5 p.p.)
and that protest participation is concentrated among a set of politically engaged citizens.
A further issue with the data is that we only have information on mobile phone use for
rounds 4 and 5. In addition, the phrasing of the question across rounds is different. In order to
characterize the determinants of mobile phone use in Afrobarometer we run an ordered probit
model of frequency of mobile phone use (5 categories, ranging from “never” to “several times
a day”) in round 5, based on a number of socio-economic characteristics, country plus year
fixed effects, and the fraction of the population in reach of signal in their cell from GSMA.
Marginal effects from these regressions are reported in column (2) of Table A.7. Mobile phone
use increases and then decreases with age, peaking at age 38, increases with education and is
higher for males compared to females. Importantly, it is also strongly positively correlated with
mobile phone coverage from GSMA. We use estimates from this model to predict mobile phones
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usage for all individuals in the Afrobarometer, including in rounds 3 and 4. We assign to each
individual a dummy equal to 1 if the estimated probability of using a mobile phone at least once
a day exceeds 50 percent. Based on this procedure, 67 percent of the individuals are predicted
to use a mobile phone.
B. Theory appendix
B.1. Setup
We consider a network of individuals characterized by the distribution P (d) (d = 0, 1, . . . , D)
of the number d of neighbors, or degree, where ∑Dd=0 P (d) = 1. We think of mobile phones as
increasing the number of neighbors and - as a result - increasing the density of the network. We
revert to a more formal definition below.
Each agent i has the choice between taking action 0, which can be thought of as the status
quo (in the present case, not protesting), or action 1 (in the present case, protesting).
We denote the utility of an agent of degree di from taking action 1 relative to action 0 when
he expects his neighbors to choose action 1 with probability y¯−i by vi = v(di, y¯−i). We follow
others in the literature (Chwe 1999, Granovetter 1978, Jackson & Yariv 2007) by assuming that
agents’ decisions are characterized by strategic complementarities, i.e. that the utility of agent
i from taking action 1 is non decreasing in y¯−i:47
∂vi
∂y¯−i
≥ 0 (B.1)
Each agent i has a cost of taking action 1, which we denote by ci. We follow others in the
literature by assuming that the opportunity cost of participating is higher when the economy
improves.48 With no loss of generality, we depart from Jackson & Yariv (2007) and assume
that costs can also vary as a function of an individual’s degree di. In formulas, we assume that
ci = c(di,∆GDP ) + i, where i is an error term that we assume independent of di and with
c.d.f. H(.) and:49
∂ci
∂∆GDP ≥ 0 (B.2)
We follow Jackson & Yariv (2006) and assume for simplicity that  is uniformly distributed.
From the above, it follows that the probability yi that an agent i of degree di decides to join a
47 Jackson & Yariv (2007) assume that at given probability of participation among neighbors, individuals with a
greater number of connections draw no less utility from participating than individuals with fewer connections,
i.e. in formulas ∂vi
∂di
≥ 0. We ignore this assumption as this is not key to our results.
48 An alternative interpretation for this assumption is that reasons for grievance increase during bad economic
times.
49 As in the case of v we remain agnostic of the sign of the partial derivative of c with respect to d as this is not
key to our results.
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protest given that his neighbors protest with probability y¯−i is:
yi = H(vi − ci) (B.3)
B.2. Equilibrium
We assume that each agent has limited information about the structure of the network: he only
knows his own degree di and cost ci and the overall distribution of degrees in the population
P (d). The play is symmetric, in the sense that every agent perceives the distribution of play
of each of his neighbors to be independent and to correspond to the population distribution of
plays.
Individuals iterate over neighbors’ best responses given the probability distribution of the
neighbors’ degrees. Under the above hypotheses an equilibrium for the game exists. In partic-
ular, at the equilibrium the fraction of individuals participating, y¯, is defined by the solution to
the following equation:
y¯ = φ(y¯) :=
D∑
d=0
P˜ (d)H(v(d, y¯)− c(d,∆GDP )) (B.4)
where P˜ (d) = P (d) dE[d] denotes the probability that a random neighbor is of degree d. The
equilibrium condition effectively states that individuals’ best responses are mutually consistent.
Although both stable and unstable equilibrium are possible in this game, we focus on the
stable equilibrium. Again following Jackson & Yariv (2007), at the stable equilibrium it must
be true that:
∂φ(.)
∂y¯
< 1 (B.5)
B.3. Participation and the state of the economy
We start by performing comparative statics on the equilibrium of the model in response to
changes in the state of the economy ∆GDP .
From the definition of yi, note that, conditional on the state of the economy and the agent’s
degree, around the equilibrium individuals will be more likely to participate the higher the
fraction of other individuals participating is:
∂yi
∂y¯ |di,∆GDP
≥ 0 (B.6)
In addition, each individual’s probability of participation will increase (decrease) as the state
of the economy deteriorates (improves):
∂yi
∂∆GDP |di,y¯
≤ 0 (B.7)
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Note that equation (B.7) refers to an individual’s propensity to participate in response to
changes in the state of the economy conditional on the individuals’ degree and the overall
fraction of individuals participating, where the latter is itself a variable affected by economic
conditions. In particular, one can show that this fraction increases (decreases) as the state of
the economy deteriorates (improves). From (B.4):
dy¯
d∆GDP =
∂φ(.)
∂∆GDP
1− ∂φ(.)
∂y¯
=
∑D
d=1 P˜ (d)
∂H(.)
∂∆GDP
1−∑Dd=1 P˜ (d)∂H(.)∂y¯
≤ 0 (B.8)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that at the equilibrium the numerator in (B.8)
is negative (from equation B.7), while the denominator is positive (from equation B.5).
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Worse economic conditions mechanically
raise each individual’s propensity to protest (equation B.7). This raises protest participation
and hence increases the fraction of those participating (this is the numerator of equation B.8).
Strategic complementarities generate an additional effect as individuals iterate over their neigh-
bors’ best responses, knowing that everybody else will be more likely to participate and to know
that everybody else will know, etc. (this is the denominator of equation B.8). This mechanism
further enhances the positive effect of recessions on the incidence of protests.
B.4. Differential responses based on the density of the network
We extend our analysis to study how economic conditions have a different impact on the prob-
ability of protesting depending on individuals’ degree and the “density” of the network, i.e. the
distribution of degrees.
In order to examine how the response of the equilibrium level of protests to changes in
∆GDP differs between denser and less-dense networks we make the following two additional
assumptions:50
∂2ci
∂∆GDP ∂di
≥ 0 (B.9)
∂2vi
∂y¯−i ∂di
≥ 0 (B.10)
Equation (B.9) states that the opportunity cost of participating responds more to the state
of the economic cycle the higher an agent’s degree. We take this assumption to reflect the cir-
cumstance that, compared to individuals with no mobile phones, those with mobile phones (i.e.
those with higher degree) experience greater decreases (increases) in the cost of participation
50 We ignore the effect of changes in density of the network on the emergence of protest at given GDP growth.
This effect is discussed in Jackson & Yariv (2007) who show that, if ∂vi
∂di
≥ 0 (and ∂ci
∂di
= 0), an increase in
density unequivocally raises protests. We remain agnostic on this effect not least because we find no support
for this prediction in the data, although a way to rationalize our empirical result is that ∂vi
∂di
≥ 0 and ∂ci
∂di
≥ 0.
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when the economy deteriorates (improves). One explanation for this is that individuals with
mobile phones are more likely to correctly perceive the actual state of the economy due to the
unadulterated nature of the information they are able to access. We label this mechanism “en-
hanced information”. An alternative explanation is that mobile phones are complementary to
aggregate economic growth in determining one’s productivity so the opportunity cost of protests
varies differentially for those with and without mobile phones along the cycle. We investigate
empirically these different explanations in Table 4.
Equation (B.10) states that the increase in utility from participation in response to a given
increase in the fraction of neighbors participating is higher for those with mobile phones com-
pared to those with no mobile phones. One way to rationalize this assumption is that mobile
phones can help a person to better coordinate with other protesters, which results in a higher
increase in utility in response to an increase in the fraction of neighbors participating. We label
this mechanism “enhanced coordination”.
The implications of these assumptions for individual behavior can be easily derived. Under
(B.9) and (B.10):
∂2yi
∂∆GDP ∂di |y¯
≤ 0 (B.11)
This means that individual i’s probability of participation increases more in response to a
deterioration in economic conditions the higher this individual’s number of connections. And:
∂2yi
∂y¯ ∂di |∆GPD
≥ 0 (B.12)
Equation (B.12) states that the effect of changes in the fraction of individuals participating
on each individual’s probability of participation increases with his number of connections.51
To understand how the density of the network affects the overall fraction of individuals
participating, we define density in terms of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD).52 Given
two networks P and Q , we say that Q is denser than P if Q˜(d) FOSD P˜ (d), i.e. if:
D∑
d=0
Q˜(d)f(d) ≥
D∑
d=0
P˜ (d)f(d) for any non-decreasing function f of d. (B.13)
We think of increasing mobile phone coverage precisely as leading to a FOSD shift in P˜ .
From (B.8), (B.9) and (B.10) it follows that a deterioration in economic conditions leads to
a larger increase in the fraction of people protesting in denser (Q) compared to less dense (P )
51 If the assumption that  is uniform does not hold, conditions (B.9) and (B.10) are replaced by the following
conditions: ∂yi
∂∆GDP ∂di |y¯−i
≤ 0 and ∂2yi
∂y¯−i ∂di |∆GPD
≥ 0.
52 The concept of FOSD captures the idea that one distribution is obtained by shifting mass from another
distribution to place it to higher values, so that the new distribution reflects an unambiguous increase in
connectivity compared to the old one.
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networks. In formulas:
− dy¯
Q
d∆GDP ≥ −
dy¯P
d∆GDP (B.14)
To see this note that from equation (B.8), − dy¯d∆GDP =
−
∑D
d=1 P˜ (d)
∂H(.)
∂∆GDP
1−
∑D
d=1 P˜ (d)
∂H(.)
∂y¯
. Under assump-
tions (B.9) and (B.10), as the density of the network increases, the numerator increases, while
the denominator decreases, so that (B.14) holds. Note that conditions (B.9) and (B.10) are
sufficient although not necessary for equation (B.14) to hold.
The intuition for this result has to do with the larger share of more connected agents in denser
networks. If individuals with more connections are more likely to increase their participation
when the economy deteriorates (equation B.9), then worse economic conditions will directly
lead to greater protest participation in denser networks. This is a compositional effect.
In this setting though, every individual will know that each individual’s propensity to partic-
ipate has increased - and that others know that - and this effect is greater in denser networks.
Once more, this effect works through strategic complementarities and further magnifies the
effect of recessions on protest participation in denser networks. This second effect is at play
provided that those with lower connections are not disproportionately more likely to respond to
greater protest participation of their neighbors, compared to those with more connections (i.e.
if equation B.10 holds).
B.5. From theory to the empirical model
The previous model provides testable implications that can be brought to the data. Let us
denote by di a dummy equal to one if an individual uses a mobile phone and let d¯ denote the
fraction of individuals with mobile phones in the population.
Linearizing equations (B.6), (B.7), (B.11) and (B.12) one can derive the following expression
for individual i participation:
yi = γ0 + γ1 di + γ2 ∆GDP di + γ3 y¯ + γ4 y¯ di + γ5 ∆GDP + i (B.15)
were yi is a dummy for individual i participating in a protest and  is an error term. If
assumptions (B.1), (B.2), (B.9) and (B.10) hold, we expect γ2, γ5 ≤ 0 and γ3, γ4 ≥ 0.
Assuming for simplicity that the fraction of individuals using a mobile phone (d) is identical
to the fraction of people in reach of the signal (Cov), and solving for y¯, it follows that:
y¯ = β0 + β1 Cov + β2 ∆GDP Cov + β3 ∆GDP +  (B.16)
where βk ≈ γk1−γ3−γ4d¯ , k = 1, 2 and for the equilibrium to be stable we expect γ3 + γ4d¯ < 1 (this
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is effectively equation (B.5)).53
Model (B.16) refers to aggregate outcomes. It says that the fraction of individuals protesting
in the economy is a negative function of GDP growth, a positive function of the share of mobile
phone coverage and a negative function of the interaction between these two variables. This
model can be estimated using GDELT and ACLED data on the occurrence of protests by cell,
or using individual data (or cell means) on protest participation from the Afrobarometer.
Although an advantage of model (B.16) is that it can be estimated directly on aggregate
data by cell, which are available consistently for the entire continent through a long period
of time, estimates of this model are unable to provide guidance on the micro-foundations of
the phenomenon under study. As said, the role of greater connectivity in enhancing protests
during bad economic times hinges on either greater responsiveness of those more connected to
economic conditions, or on their greater responsiveness to their peers’ participation compared
to those less connected. These two effects though cannot be told apart in an aggregate equation
like (B.16).
However, one can make some progress using micro-data. If one is able to consistently estimate
the parameters of equation (B.15), then one will be able to say whether and to what extent
the differential effect of mobile phone coverage in response to a recession on protests is due
to either higher sensitivity to changes in economic conditions (γ2 < 0) or greater strategic
complementarities (γ4 > 0) among those connected, or both.
Identification of model (B.15) involves some challenges though. Even ignoring the possibility
of non-random allocation of mobile phones across areas and individuals, estimates of model
(B.15) will still be potentially plagued by a classical reflexivity problem (Manski 1993). However,
equation (B.16) suggests that one can obtain consistent estimates of the parameters in (B.15)
by instrumenting average participation in the economy y¯ (and its interaction with mobile phone
use di) with mobile phone coverage d¯ and its interaction with GDP growth (as well as their
interaction with mobile phone use di). Intuitively, and conditional on di, the fraction of those
covered in society d¯ will only matter for individual participation through a spillover effect.
B.6. The role of enhanced information and enhanced coordination
We separate the effect of enhanced information (through the term γ2) from the effect due to
enhanced coordination (through the term γ4) as follows. Aggregating model (B.15) across indi-
viduals in each cell/year and linearizing, this delivers model (B.16), where β2 ≈ γ2(1−γ3)+γ5 γ4(1−γ3−γ4d¯)2 .
The latter is a slightly more cumbersome expression for β2 than the one in the previous section,
although it is also more precise and it proves more useful for the decomposition at hand. The
first term captures the effect of enhanced information, while the second captures the effect of
enhanced coordination. Their ratio is γ2(1−γ3)γ5 γ4 . From this it is straightforward to derive an
expression for the fraction of β2 attributable to each of these different sources.
53 Alternatively, let d¯ = κ0 + κ1 Cov + τ. In this case, βk ≈ γkκ11−γ3−γ4d¯ for k=1, 2.
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A. Appendix figures and tables
Figure A.1 Mobile phone diffusion, Nigeria 1998-2012
Notes. The figure reports the spread of 2G coverage in Nigeria between 1998 and 2012 at 5-year intervals. Source: GSMA.
55
Figure A.2 Geo-located protest events, Cairo 2011
Notes. The figure reports the occurrence of protests in Cairo in 2011 by location. Larger dots correspond to more days of
protests in a certain location. Source: GDELT.
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Figure A.4 Cross-sectional relationship between coverage and protests
Notes. The figure reports log protests per 100,000 individuals based on GDELT on the vertical axis and the fraction
of the population covered by 2G signal on the horizontal axis. Averages between 1998 and 2012 by country reported.
The size of each circle is proportional to the country population.
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Figure A.7 Lightning strikes in Africa
Notes. The figure reports the average number of lightning strikes between 1995 and 2010 in each 0.5◦ x 0.5◦ degree cell. Source:
NASA.
61
Figure A.8 The effect of coverage on protests at different levels of GDP growth - 2SLS
Notes. The figure reports separate 2SLS estimates and the associated confidence intervals for
the effect of coverage on protests in GDELT at five intervals of the GDP growth distribution:
(−∞,−0.025]; (−0.025, 0]; (0, 0.025]; (0.025, 0.05]; (0.05,∞].
62
Figure A.9 Reduced-form estimates of protests on Z by sub-periods
Notes. The figure reports the estimated reduced-form coefficients of the variable Z (parameter ρ2 in
equation 5.1) by 3-year sub-periods and the corresponding 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Table A.1 Cell-level covariates
Variable Source Short Description
Population PRIO-GRID
Population size for each cell, extracted from the Gridded Population of the World,
v.3 (CIESIN 2005). Data are available for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. We obtain
the remaining years by linear interpolation.
Cities (number) GRUMP
Number of cities in the cell at year 2000, calculated in GIS from the Global Rural-
Urban Mapping Project, v.1
Border Distance (100 km)
Capital Distance (100 km)
Coast (dummy)
PRIO-GRID
Border distance calculated from the cell centroid to the border of the nearest neigh-
boring country, regardless of whether this is located across international waters.
Capital distance calculated from the cell centroid to the national capital city. Ge-
ographical coordinates for the capital cities capture changes over time wherever
relevant. Coast is a dummy for the cell being coastal.
Primary Roads (100 km)
− Total
− Paved
− Good conditions
Secondary Roads (100 km)
Africa Infrastructure
Country diagnostic
(ADB)
Geo-referenced roads files are downloaded separately for each country. Data usually
refer to network in 2007, and are discussed in Gwilliam et al. (2008). For each cell
we calculate the road network in GIS. Country-specific files are not available for
North-African countries. In this case, data are obtained from the Roads of Africa
dataset, but lack information on roads conditions.
Electricity (100 km)
Africa Infrastructure
Country diagnostic
(ADB)
Geo-referenced electricity files are available from the ADB dataset for all countries,
except Egypt, Libya and Morocco. For these countries, data are obtained from the
OpenStreetMap project. Data usually refer to the network in 2007. For each cell
we calculate the electricity network in GIS.
Travel T ime nearest city :
pop. ≥ 50K (hours)
PRIO-GRID
Estimated cell-average travel time (in hours) by land transportation from the cell
centroid to the nearest major city with more than 50,000 inhabitants. The values
are extracted from a global high-resolution raster map of accessibility, where time
reflects the average pixel value within each cell.
Infant Mortality Rate (h) PRIO-GRID
The cell-specific infant mortality rate is based on raster data from the SEDAC
Global Poverty Mapping project. The variable is the average pixel value inside the
grid cell. The unit is the number of children per 10,000 that die before reaching
their first birthday. The indicator is available for the year 2000.
Mountain (%)
Forest (%)
Irrigated (%)
PRIO-GRID
Mountain is the share of mountainous terrain within each cell. This indicator is
based on high-resolution mountain raster data from the UNEP’s Mountain Watch
Report 2002. Forest is the share of forest cover in a cell extracted from the Glob-
Cover 2009 dataset. Irrigation is the share of area equipped for irrigation within
each cell from the FAO Aquastat irrigation raster.
Conflict (dummy) PRIO-GRID
The dummy indicates whether the grid cell is located in a conflict zone in each given
year, from the Conflict Site coding, v.3 (Dittrich Hallberg 2012). The indicator
contains time-varying values for the period 1998-2008.
Diamonds (dummy)
Diamond dataset
PRIO
The variable includes any site with known activity, meaning production or confirmed
discovery. For each cell we calculate the presence of a diamond mine in GIS.
Oil (%)
Petroleum dataset
PRIO
The petroleum dataset groups oil fields in polygons within a buffer distance of 30
km. For each cell we calculate the percentage that is covered by an oil-field in GIS.
Mineral (dummy)
U.S. Geological
Survey
For each site the exact location and type of mineral is reported, as well as the
magnitude of production. For each cell we calculate the presence of a mine in GIS.
Temperature (Celsius)
Precipitation (mm.)
Drought (number of years)
Avg. Distance from drought (100 km)
PRIO-GRID
Temperature and precipitation are the yearly mean temperature and total amount
of precipitation in the cell, from the University of Delaware (NOAA 2011). We
calculate the average for the period 1946-2008. Drought is number of years during
1998-2012 in which the cell is subject to drought, measured as within-year deviations
from average. The measure is coded 1 if at least three consecutive months were more
than 1 s.d. away from the average monthly values. Distance from drought is the
average distance over the period 1998-2012 to the nearest cell incurring a drought.
flashrate (per km2 per year) GHCC/NASA
Data refer to lightning activity calculated from the Optical Transient Detector
(OTD) and the Lightning Imaging Sensor (LIS). Each flash is recorded along with
its spatial location (latitude, longitude) with a level of resolution of 5-10 km on the
ground. The GHCC calculates the average flash density in 0.5◦ x 0.5◦ grid cells
over the period 1995-2010.
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Table A.2 Afrobarometer country-rounds availability
Round 3 (2005/06) Round 4 (2008/09) Round 5 (2011/13)
Benin 1,190 [37] 1,184 [33] 592 [33]
Botswana 1,182 [53] 920 [42] 880 [41]
Burkina-Faso - 968 [53] 576 [40]
Burundi - - 1,200 [15]
Cameroon - - 656 [55]
Cape-Verde 765 [5] 656 [10] 719 [7]
Ghana 1,165 [71] 960 [60] 1,376 [66]
Guinea - - 1,136 [42]
Ivory-Coast - - 1,136 [57]
Kenya 1,246 [45] 960 [34] 2,135 [31]
Lesotho 1,161 [10] 1,192 [9] 1,197 [9]
Liberia - 797 [28] 873 [25]
Madagascar 1,333 [191] 1,152 [183] 1,012 [216]
Malawi 1,199 [34] 1,152 [23] 1,523 [40]
Mali 1,187 [101] 960 [115] 986 [94]
Mozambique 1,198 [111] 1,088 [85] 1,936 [99]
Namibia 1,139 [82] 1,024 [49] 1,097 [52]
Nigeria 2,200 [193] 1,781 [197] 1,936 [182]
Senegal 1,200 [47] 1,030 [25] 1,176 [34]
Sierra-Leone - - 550 [28]
South-Africa 2,171 [212] 2,220 [188] 1,400 [130]
Swaziland - - 456 [7]
Tanzania 1,203 [102] 1,024 [68] 2,144 [94]
Togo - - 368 [14]
Uganda 2,400 [60] 2,431 [46] 1,444 [57]
Zambia 1,200 [103] 1,200 [68] 1,176 [71]
Zimbabwe 914 [44] 1,000 [42] 1,888 [48]
Notes. The table reports the number of individuals by country in rounds 3 to 5 of Afrobarometer.
The number of cells identified for each country in each round is reported in parenthesis.
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Table A.3 Descriptive statistics Afrobarometer
Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Individuals (78,167)
Protest participation 0.12 0.32 0 1
Mobile phone 0.67 0.47 0 1
Age 36.66 14.65 18 130
Primary education 0.61 0.49 0 1
Gender 0.5 0.5 0 1
Adults in household 3 2.29 0 40
Unemployed 0.66 0.47 0 1
Worse economic condition (personal) 0.35 0.48 0 1
Worse economic condition (country) 0.38 0.49 0 1
Distrust president 0.64 0.48 0 1
Disapprove president 0.70 0.46 0 1
Cells (2,082)
Population (1000s) 527.61 876.83 0 7,841
Mobile phone 2G coverage (percent) 0.82 0.28 0 1
Protests per 100, 000 pop.−GDELT 2.86 8.54 0 540.41
Protests per 100, 000 pop.−ACLED 0.27 0.87 0 217.63
Country GDP growth (percent) 0.06 0.02 -0.18 0.15
Notes. The table reports descriptive statistics for individuals in Afrobarometer (upper panel) as well as the corresponding
cell characteristics (lower panel). Data in the upper panel are weighted by individual sampling weights. Data in the
lower panel are weighted by cell population.
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Table A.4 Night lights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced-form 2SLS
Z -0.012 -0.012
(0.019) (0.019)
∆GDP X Z 0.029 0.043
(0.080) (0.067)
Coverage 3.911 1.016
(6.482) (1.853)
∆GDP X Coverage -2.183 -5.048
(8.918) (7.645)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell-level Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 148,010 148,010 148,010 148,010
Notes. The table reports estimated coefficients from separate regressions
of average night lights intensity in each cell/year, on a number of vari-
ables. Columns (1) and (2) report reduced-form specifications (equation
5.1) while columns (3) and (4) report 2SLS estimates (equations 4.1 and
4.2). See also notes to Table 3.
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Table A.5 Robustness checks: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S.e. clustered Country One protest Square root
at country level trends per day protest
GDELT
Coverage -0.032 -1.078 -0.065 -0.001
(0.284) (1.315) (0.204) (0.001)
∆GDP X Coverage -6.325** -8.963*** -5.317*** -0.040***
(2.850) (3.216) (1.600) (0.012)
ACLED
Coverage 0.032 0.214 0.009 0.000
(0.154) (0.308) (0.103) (0.000)
∆GDP X Coverage -1.713** -1.635 -1.782** -0.007*
(0.760) (1.029) (0.855) (0.004)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,415 152,415 152,415 152,415
Notes. The table reports the same specification as in columns (4) and (6) of Table 3. The upper
panel refers to GDELT while the lower panel refers to ACLED. Column (1) reports standard
errors clustered at the country level. Column (2) controls for cell-specific cross-sectional charac-
teristics interacted with country-specific linear trends. In column (3) the dependent variable is
defined as number of days of protests in a given cell/year. In column (4) the dependent variable
is the square root of the number of protests per capita. See also notes to Table 3.
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Table A.7 Individual correlates of protest participation and mobile phone use
(1) (2)
Protest Participation Mobile phone use
Age/100 0.193*** 2.580***
(0.043) (0.244)
Age/100 sq. -0.270*** -3.410***
(0.045) (0.283)
Female -0.035*** -0.221***
(0.003) (0.013)
City 0.005 0.433***
(0.004) (0.028)
Adults in household 0.004*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.003)
Informal ed. -0.003 0.393***
(0.007) (0.046)
Incomplete primary 0.009* 0.432***
(0.005) (0.027)
Completed primary 0.017*** 0.789***
(0.005) (0.029)
Incomplete sec. 0.041*** 0.989***
(0.006) (0.030)
Completed sec. 0.033*** 1.267***
(0.006) (0.033)
Some tertiary (not college) 0.048*** 1.531***
(0.007) (0.051)
Some college 0.133*** 1.525***
(0.013) (0.068)
Completed college 0.076*** 1.682***
(0.010) (0.057)
Postgraduate 0.116*** 1.813***
(0.027) (0.142)
Coverage 0.378***
(0.060)
Cell FE Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Country X Year FE Yes No
Cell-level Controls Yes No
Observations 75,175 30,465
Notes. The table reports individual-level regressions based on Afrobarometer
data. The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the respondent attended a demonstration or protest during the previous year; in
column (2) is an ordered variable for frequency of mobile phone use (from 0 or
“never” to 4 or “several times a day”). This latter variable is only available for
Round 5. Note that because Afrobarometer Round 5 extends over multiple years
(see Table A.2), year fixed effects can be included in the specification in column
(2). Method of estimation in column (1): OLS; in column (2): Ordered Probit
(marginal coefficients reported). Regressions weighted by individual sampling
weights. Standard errors clustered by cell.
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Table A.8 Protests, GDP growth and mobile phone coverage in Afrobarometer cells: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Afrobarometer GDELT ACLED
Coverage 0.017 -0.007 0.170 0.500** 0.076 0.125
(0.022) (0.026) (0.230) (0.240) (0.094) (0.135)
∆GDP X Coverage -0.931*** -0.761** -6.573** -8.874*** -3.569** -4.307**
(0.252) (0.320) (3.279) (3.375) (1.658) (2.135)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell-level Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,336 4,336 4,336 4,336 4,336 4,336
Notes. The table reports the same specifications as in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 estimated
for the sample of cells/years available in Afrobarometer, where the dependent variables are: fraction
participating in a protest from Afrobarometer (columns 1 and 2), log protests per 100,000 people
from GDELT (columns 3 and 4) and log protests per 100,000 people from ACLED (columns 5 and
6). See also notes to Table 2.
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Table A.9 First-stage estimates: Afrobarometer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Participating % Participating X Mobile
%Mobile 0.042* 0.034 -0.023 -0.045**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.015) (0.018)
∆GDP X %Mobile -0.975*** -0.692* -0.103 0.228
(0.373) (0.365) (0.211) (0.249)
%Mobile X Mobile 0.006 -0.004 0.130*** 0.128***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.018)
∆GDP X %Mobile X Mobile -0.145 0.004 -1.230*** -1.151***
(0.233) (0.186) (0.333) (0.330)
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country X Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell-level Controls No Yes No Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,082 2,082 2,082 2,082
Notes. The table reports first-stage estimates underlying the 2SLS estimates of equation (4.3) reported
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.
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